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Introduction
Behavioral economics is emerging as an important new disciplinary adjunct to legal analysis in a
wide range of fields from the meta territories of jurisprudence and judicial decision making to the traditional
zones of contracts and torts to the specialized areas of tax and health law.  It shakes up thought and
reorients scholarship laden by its progenitor, law and economics, to revise received wisdom that assumed
the bounded but substantial rationality of human actors and prescribed legal rules and social norms
according to sterile abstractions that bore little resemblance to actual human beings but which could be
modeled in elegant and simple ways.  The encrusted models become more realistic accounts of complex
human behavior originally mapped in the field of cognitive psychology, adapted by economists, and lately
being imported by legal scholars.1
One corner of this behavioral orientation toward economics and law and the vast social domains
those disciplines canvass examines the way stocks are priced in public capital markets and the knowledge
being generated from this investigation has significant implications for the field of corporate governance.
Corporate law and economics has assumed that prices of publicly traded stocks are formed as the best
estimate of the value of the ownership interest in the businesses they represent.  Thousands of investors
study relevant and reliable information about the cash flows companies are expected to generate and price
their stocks based on a risk-adjusted multiple of them.  Some investors may act irrationally in the process,
but there are enough rational ones to offset (and indeed take advantage of) their mistakes so that the pricing
mechanism does work and the stock markets are best described as being efficient.
A set of cultural beliefs accompany this view that stock markets are efficient in the sense of
accurately pricing business value.2  Chief among these is that the stock market itself operates as a
disciplining device on corporate managers.  Their company’s stock prices are an accurate and transparent
report card on their performance–a manager that performs poorly will see his company’s stock price fall
and be held accountable.  Accountability could take the form of an unwanted takeover of the company by
a third party through which the manager is ousted.  It could come from the impairment of reputation that
would diminish a manager’s future job prospects.  It also could come in the form of a cooled reception by
investors to any future plans the manager may have to attract additional financing to run or expand the
company’s business.  The efficient market’s discipline extends to put limits on managerial discretion over
major capital structure and allocation decisions, such as the mix of debt and equity in the firm, the level of
4dividends, and the timing and extent of stock repurchases.
From these beliefs follows a set of legal principles.  The market for corporate control should be
unburdened by rules of timing, disclosure, payment or other tilts in the playing field.   Fiduciary duties could
be relied upon in quite weak forms to police those rare managers who somehow escape the clutches of
market discipline to act contrary to the corporation’s and shareholders’ interests.   Broad deference could
be given to director decisions on the whole range of capital decisions.  Concern over the type and timing
of company disclosure, and even the principles of accounting applied in preparing financial statements,
could be limited since the activity of the efficient market and its participants will pierce these, getting at the
real truth and reflecting it in market price.  Investors, on the other side, could be presumed to rely upon
misleading managerial statements when they in fact rely solely on market price–when it turns out that what
management was saying was false, judges could presume that investors relied on the price as a reflection
of what management was saying without the need to ask whether the investor actually did rely on what
management was saying.
The efficient market idea, and the set of cultural norms and legal principles that these examples
typify, dominated thought and practice in the field of financial economics and corporate law beginning in
the 1960s and continuing with undiminished zeal through the late 1980s.  Though the zeal abated as the
1990s progressed, and today many more sceptics voice doubt upon the validity of these ideas, the theory
of efficient markets and its implications remain widely embraced and the legal culture those ideas spawned
remains endowed with its teachings.  
A sub-discipline of behavioral economics is blossoming that enervates the 30-year old tenets of the
efficient market story.  Called behavioral finance, it rests on two foundations.  The first is that a substantial
amount of stock pricing is performed by investors who do not accurately perceive underlying business
values, and hence produce prices that do not equal those values.  Investor sentiment, rather than rational
economic calculation, contributes significantly to price formation.  The second is that even those investors
who do accurately perceive underlying business values will not always step in to offset the sentiments of
those who do not, for they face risks too great for such an undertaking.  This limited arbitrage, when
coupled with investor sentiment, yields pricing that does not equate to value and the managerial report card
seen in prices turns out often to be inaccurate, even if it remains translucid.
In the world of behavioral finance, no longer can the social or legal culture be content to rely upon
market mechanisms for the work of managerial discipline.  Neither the market for corporate control nor
that for managerial labor is as potent in the behavioral finance story as it was in the world where efficient
stock markets ruled.  Fiduciary duties, disclosure, and accounting play an important role in holding
managerial feet to the fire.  Capital structure and allocation decisions are far more flexible and
unrestrained–dividend policy, the debt/equity mix, and stock repurchases all matter as substantive decisions
and manifestations of managerial probity and intelligence.  Investors, on the other side again, may rely upon
market prices in allocating their investment capital but that reliance is functionally irrelevant to legal questions
concerning whether a management that misleads should be found liable to an investor who does not rely
on what was misleading.
3  Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of
the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 546 (1994).
4  I call this “investor governance” to distinguish it from the literature to date, which has tended to
focus on manager actions.  E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis,
68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1023, 1035 n.57 (2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral
Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101 (1998); Donald
C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences
of Independence and Accountability, unpublished manuscript available on the Legal Scholarship Network
(2000); Jeffrey Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging In Hindsight, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev.
571 (1998).   Part I of this piece focuses on investor actions in markets that drive the legal issues in Part
II’s discussion of investor education, market regulation, director duties, and the reliance requirement in
securities fraud litigation, which I consider to be key components of investor governance.
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The death of the efficient market idea has been coming for a number of years, but it has held onto
breath even as research steadily reveals its fatal infirmities.  Dozens of law review articles have brought to
the legal academy the evidence from economics and finance scholarship showing the demise of the efficient
market story, yet scores more proceed with at least tacit acceptance of its force and implications.   My
contribution to these discussions alerted corporate law scholars to the decay of the efficient market idea
wrought by studies as they stood in behavioral finance of the early 1990s, along with the intellectual history
of the model that showed it was heading for a dead end.3 This piece is the continuation of that story, with
subsequent and stronger evidence that the model is poor grounds for legal policy formulation and a broader
account of the implications of that conclusion. 
Part I presents behavioral finance as to how prices of stocks are formed–including a theoretical
framework, empirical evidence, and psychological explanations.  It integrates these materials into a model
of market and investor behavior that can be used as a lens through which to analyze a wide variety of legal
rules and policies bearing on market regulation and corporate governance.  
Part II is a series of prescriptions on the implications of this account relating to investor
governance.4  It starts with a proposal to promote and expand investor education concerning the cognitive
biases behavioral finance exposes. It proceeds to introduce and propose reforms in three critical areas of
law and policy that this model impacts: (1) the market regulatory environment in which investors participate,
including suitability and churning rules and policies relating to day trading, margin trading, and circuit
breakers; (2) the legal duties of boards of directors in making capital allocation decisions such as equity
offerings, dividend distributions and stock acquisitions; and (3) issues in corporate and securities litigation,
principally the reliance requirement in securities fraud cases and the stock market exception to the appraisal
remedy in cash out mergers.
The efficient market idea turns out to be an aspiration worth pursuing, but one never likely to be
realized.  These proposals and prescriptions therefore operate both to push the reality toward the ideal and
to deal with the gap that will persist.  The article has a major public policy sub-text too–at stake in the
5    E.g., Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices,  41
Duke L.J. 977 (1991).   Stock markets are a means of allocating capital.  Social wealth is greatest when
capital is allocated to its most productive uses.  Prices that equal underlying values will effect that allocation
best.  Prices that deviate from values will misallocate to the extent of the difference.  The social cost of
misallocated capital is a multiple of the foregone opportunities that properly allocated capital would have
generated.  Additional costs result from the increased risk investors face in misallocations.  That increased
risk will discourage investment, lead investors to demand a higher rate of return, increase the cost of capital,
decrease its supply, and drain overall economic horsepower.
6  Proper pricing means prices approximately equal to values, with value defined as the present
value of the cash flows a corporation is estimated to generate from the date of calculation to the infinite
horizon period.  Value in this model is thus determinate as a theoretical and philosophical matter (though
the calculation in practice remains fraught with judgments).  The term proper pricing thus equates to value
but this should not be seen to constitute a conflation of the two in a philosophical sense.  Compare Kyron
Huigens, Law, Economics, and the Skeleton of Value Fallacy, 82 Cal. L. Rev.  xxx (2001) (critique of
traditional and behavioral law and economics on the philosophical grounds that value is intransitive and
incommensurable and, therefore, has an ineluctable “tragic dimension,” the part not accounted for in price,
rendering economic analysis of law both impossible and useless).
7  Andri Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance 1 (2000).
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discussion of how prices are formed is the overarching question of capital allocation.  Society is better off
in terms of aggregate wealth when its resources are allocated to those best able to deploy them.  Investors
allocating capital based on rational calculation will produce that result, while those allocating based on
sentiment will not.5  Attention to this difference is also important to the distributive question, not only since
a smaller pie will yield less for certain groups, but because a skewed allocation can widen the gap between
the rich and the poor.  Proper pricing–or at least an understanding that improper pricing may exist and
why–is thus a transcendent social question, not merely a tiny corner of scholarship in law and behavioral
economics, though it also certainly is that.6
I.  Behavioral Finance
The efficient market idea contends that prices of securities in public capital markets always reflect
all available information about the underlying businesses they represent.  The theory has been described
as “dazzling” and as an “enormous theoretical and empirical success.”7  The entire field of academic finance
was created on its basis, starting in the economics department of the University of Chicago, spreading to
every department of every university in the country, and ultimately penetrating trading, board, court and
class rooms worldwide.  Despite that success, the EMH has always suffered from theoretical and empirical
limitations or exceptions, which of late have gone to consume it.  In its wake stands behavioral finance as
a rival account of capital markets.
8  Paul Samuelson, Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 Indus. Mgmt.
Rev. 41 (1965).
9  Benoit Mandelbrot, Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and Martingale Models, 39
J. Bus. 242 (1966).
10  Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin.
383 (1970).
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A.  Foundations and Legal Import of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
The theoretical foundations of the EMH were laid by Paul Samuleson8 and Benoit Mandelbrot.9
In essence, they supposed that investors act rationally in making the investment decisions that result in stock
price changes and levels.    The consequences were equivalence between price and value and a random
element to the process of price formation that rendered impossible predictions of future price movements
and systematically earning higher than normal returns.
Rationality did not have to be complete, however, and the model allowed for the participation of
nonrational or irrational persons.  Their contributions would have the tendency to push prices away from
values but, the theory went on, those deviations would not persist due to arbitrage by the rational
participants, whose trading would restore the price-value identity and reinforce the basic conclusions of the
model.
Eugene Fama laid the EMH’s empirical foundations, starting with the proposition that stale
information about a company was of no value to a stock trader.10   The hypothesis was that an investor
cannot use information such as past prices, public disclosures, and maybe even privileged data to make
money in the stock market.  Such information is instantly absorbed into the price by traders who get the
information first and act on it, so knowing it thereafter gives an investor no advantage.  There was a sort
of noncontroversial and commonsensical appeal to this proposition (except maybe with respect to
privileged information), but the harder empirical question was what was meant by advantage to an investor.
Obviously people can make money in the stock market by looking at information, but the key
empirical point of  the EMH was that they could not use stale information to earn more money than would
compensate them for bearing the risk of the investment.  Risk was adjusted for in the EMH by a pricing
model, most famously the “capital asset pricing model,” that specified the risk associated with each stock.
The empirical claim was that no investor can use stale information to get returns greater than justified by
the associated risk the CAPM defined for the investment.
The theoretical and empirical foundations of the EMH were powerful, constituting a major
academic success story, leading to the tenuring of scores of bright young economists and to the awarding
of Nobel prizes to about a dozen of their elders.  In the triumphant congratulations of one of the pioneers,
Michael Jensen announced in the early 1980s that the EMH was the best established fact in all the social
11  Ronald Gilson & Renier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549,
550 (1984).  
12  See Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities Regulation, supra.
13  Id.
14  This plausibility is shown by the unusual degree to which some of the assumptions necessary to
sustain the economist’s “perfect market” are met in public capital markets: there are a large number of
participants such that the actions of any individual participant cannot materially affect the market;
participants are fully informed, have equal access to the market, and act rationally; the commodity is
homogeneous; and there are no transaction costs.  E.g., Paul A. Samuelson, Economics 43, 56 (10th ed.
1976).  
15  E.g., Fisher Black, Noise, 41 J. Fin. 529 (1986).
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sciences.  Not an overly broad claim at the time perhaps, but with the passing of the years and the
emergence of newer studies, one continues to wonder whether the claim said more about the social
sciences than it did about the EMH.
Among legal scholars, the EMH became so dominant by the mid 1980s that two leading corporate
law teachers announced that it was the context to discuss markets and their regulation.11  Some legal rules
were expressly linked to the theory, especially the stock market exception to the appraisal remedy, the
fraud on the market theory, and event study techniques for measuring damages in securities fraud cases.12
Others were more loosely or rhetorically based on it, such as the SEC’s integrated disclosure system
initiative and its shelf registration rules.13  
In between these particularizations and far more broadly, the EMH exemplified the most successful
constructs and applications of law and economics generally.  The chief reason for this success was that of
all the places where theoretical rational actors gather to produce results that look highly rational–whether
in contracts, property, or courtrooms–it was in the public capital markets that they did so with greatest
plausibility.14  As a result, discussions of a whole range of topics in corporate and securities law went
forward with a backdrop of the EMH if not express articulation of its premises.  This privileged position
remains a fixture of the culture of business law scholarship, even if its purchase has declined as legal
scholars have digested the challenges to the EMH uncovered by behavioral economists and discussed next.
B.  Challenges to the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
Theoretical challenges to the EMH question the assumed rationality of investors.  Drawing on the
1970s pioneering work of cognitive psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, as early as the
mid 1980s economists speculated that many traders act not on information but on hunch and that the
market absorbs no more rationality of calculation than it does mere noise.15  More recent theorizing on
investor behavior has considered the nature of investor attitudes towards risk and the way investors make
16  The first two of these form the basis of the model that follows; the third is not implicated by the
model but is taken up as a separate series of phenomena more localized in the part that follows.
17 Take an example where alternative end states are identical but the ways of getting their differ and
people systematically opt for one rather than the other:
Question A:  Suppose you are richer by $20,000 than you are and pick from the following choices:
(1) receive $5,000 or (2) receive a 50% chance of winning $10,000 (and a 50% chance of winning
nothing).
Question B: Suppose you are richer by $30,000 than you are and pick from the following choices:
(1) forfeit $5,000 or (2) take a 50% chance of losing $10,000 (and a 50% chance of losing
nothing).
In terms of end states, the problems are identical: in each Question the expected value of choice (1) is a
position $25,000 richer than you are (in A, $20,000 + $5,000 and in B, $30,000 - $5,000) and the
expected value of choice (2) is also $25,000 (you end up with either $20,000 or $30,000 with equal
probabilities).  Most people see these Questions as quite different, and not because of the suppositions
about being richer by either amount, but because of the routes to the end. Among those inclined to gamble
on either Question, the tendency is to gamble on the downside (picking the gamble that includes possibly
losing nothing) and the sure thing on the upside (picking the cash despite the possibility of gaining more).
These choices also illustrate the phenomenon of frame dependence, discussed below.  See Daniel
Kahneman & Mark W. Riepe, Aspects of Investor Psychology, 24 J. Port. Mgmt. 52, 56-57 (1998).
This description of investor behavior also applies to manager behavior in evaluating potential
acquisition transactions discussed below in Part II.B.
18  For example, people asked how much they would have to stand to gain from the flip of a coin
turning up heads in order to take a bet that if it comes up tails they would pay $100 tend to site a range
from $200 to $250.  Kahneman & Reipe, supra.  In economic terms they exhibit a loss function steeper
than a gain function.  See Sheifler, supra, at xxx. 
19  Terrance Odean, Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?, 53 J. Fin. 1775 (1998).
To illustrate the sort of loss aversion known as the disposition effect and how it leads investors to cling
to losing stocks consider this hypothetical: Highball and Lowball bought IBM shares at $200 and $100,
respectively, and today’s closing IBM price was $150, down $10.  Who is more unhappy about today’s
$10 decline?  Most people concur Highball is unhappier at the $10 decline for he is suffering further losses
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decisions using attention and memory more than probabilistic analysis (and even how the influences of
autonomous brain activity can produce judgments outside of a person’s awareness).16
In terms of assessing risk, investors tend not to look at levels of final wealth attainable but at gains
or losses  relative to a reference point.17  The path can be more important than the end.  In considering
the assumption of risk, people display loss aversion, a tendency to place an asymmetrically greater value
on losses compared to gains.18  It is epitomized in the reluctance of investors to sell stocks that have
suffered substantial losses19 and in the puzzlingly high premium returns attributable to investments in equity
whereas Lowball is still ahead of his purchase price by a substantial amount.  For the same reason, it would
be harder for Highball than Lowball to sell IBM even given the same fundamental picture of that company’s
prospects.  Id.
You can see the sort of loss aversion known as the endowment effect by a classic study where
one group’s members are each given a coffee mug and another group’s members given $6 cash apiece.
The mug group are asked to name their sale price for a mug and the cash group are asked to name their
buy price.  The groups are told that with that information the experimenters would figure out the market
clearing price and effect swaps of cash for mugs that satisfied the clearing price.  The behavioral surprise
is that mug owners put a price on the mugs of about twice what the cash holders did, even after repeat
plays of the game were held, contrary to the symmetry of valuation one would expect under rational choice
theory.  Daniel Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,
98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325 (1990). 
A different explanation that is more consistent with rational choice theory is simply that this
preference differential reflects social norms oriented toward bargaining in which bidding low and selling high
are standard.  The parties with mugs have differentiated goods while those with cash have the currency of
the realm by which everything else in exchange is measured.  They are buyers and sellers.  Sellers sell high;
buyers buy low.  Another is that experiments such as these tend to be performed on people with experience
as buyers but not as sellers (often the subjects are university students), raising some question as to whether
the results generalize to actual market behavior.  Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral
Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1551, 1556 (1998).
20  The equity risk premium puzzle refers to the observed departure, compared to bonds, of the
actual return on stock investments over long period times above that predicted by economic theories and
asset pricing models associated with the efficient market hypothesis.  The puzzle generated legions of
scholarship within the EMH tradition without any satisfactory solution, though adopting a behavioral finance
perspective on the puzzle it dissolves–investors hold risk appetites that differ from those postulated by the
EMH and its theoretical cognates.   See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and
the Equity Risk Premium Puzzle, 110 Q.J. Econ. 75 (1995) (returns on stocks and bonds explainable in
terms of risk aversion without any premium “puzzle”).  In particular, it is true that stocks are riskier than
bonds in terms of repayment of principal and of income generation but not so much riskier to justify the
historical difference in actual returns on these two asset classes of about 6%.  Rather, that substantial
spread is attributed to investor loss aversion that gives greater weight to losses than to gains, a weight in
this case greater by about 2.5 times.  Id.  
21   Consdier the famous Tversky & Kahneman illustration of frame dependence in their theater-
goer comparative:
1.  You are on your way to see a play for which you do not have a ticket.  Tickets cost $10.  You
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rather than fixed income securities.20 
Related to the way reference points are created is how they influence solutions.  Different decisions
will be made depending on how a problem is framed.21  This frame dependence shows itself in the observed
realize that you have lost $10 from your wallet.  Will you still buy a ticket for the play?
2.  You are on your way to see a play for which you had purchased a ticket for $10.  You realize
that you have lost your ticket.  Will you buy another?
These situations are analytically, financially, and cost-benefit wise identical, yet subjects distinguish their
answers, virtually all saying yes to question 1 but a majority saying no to question 2.  See Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Science 453 (1981).
A similar sort of frame dependence is exhibited in the pair of choice presented in the illustration of
reference point relativity, supra note xx (decision to gamble on one but not the other of two identical
outcomes influenced by description of one as offering upside potential and the other as posing downside
risk).
22   Benartzi & Thaler, supra (1995); see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1534 (1998).
23  Suppose, for example, two goals are to produce an aggregate amount of savings to fund a
child’s college tuition 10 years from now and to own a brand new car.  It is very common for people with
these two goals to establish a savings account to meet the educational goal and to take a bank loan to
purchase the car.   This strategy may impose discipline against invading the child’s education savings
account. It is an example of a class of techniques colloquially known as making separate mental accounts
for different needs.  Generations have been reared to think this way, but from a financial viewpoint this
narrow framing by separating the goals is not maximizing and not consistent with rational choice theory.
The car loan will invariably cost more (say 10%) than the savings account pays (say 5%, minus say 1%
allocable to income taxes on the interest).  A superior strategy would frame the question in broad terms,
combining rather than separating the goals.  Use the cash that would be earning 4% to pay for the car (or
part of it) and that money will be working to save the 10% cost of the loan (plus income taxes).  The
savings account won’t get funded today but it will get funded tomorrow, with an ultimate balance higher
than under the narrow frame strategy.  
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tendency of experimental subjects to allocate more to stocks when they are shown long-term histories of
high returns to stocks than they do when they are shown short-term histories of substantial price volatility.22
Another aspect of frame dependence concerns how broadly or narrowly a decision is drawn in
relation to others.  Decisions are often presented in apparent isolation of each other, though they may be
about subjects that are related.  Rational choice theory prescribes choosing options in particular decisions
that produce the best final or aggregate state of affairs (in investing terms, the highest financial value from
all investment positions and decisions net).  To do so, all components of that final state of affairs must
simultaneously be evaluated rather than judged on their own discrete terms.  Yet across a whole range of
investment decisions, investors tend to isolate and make individual decisions rather than develop an overall
and integrated investment policy.23
24  Rational choice theory says to pick among uncertain prospects, figure the probability that each
will happen, assign a value to each possible outcome, and choose the prospect with the highest product
of probability times value. Practical decision making by actual people operating on intuition does not work
the way of the theory’s prescription.  Those that come the closest might be the scrawl of Charles Darwin
concerning the pros and cons of choosing to marry versus not to marry, Charles Darwin, The
Autobiography of Charles Darwin, 1809-1882 (N. Barlow, ed., 1969) (first published 1887), and the letter
of Ben Franklin to Joseph Priestly describing “moral algebra”, the process of recording on a sheet of paper
the pros and cons of a decision over a period of several days before choosing.   Benjamin Franklin,
Writings (1987) (first written Sept. 19, 1772).  Even so, results of such pragmatic approaches vary from
those prescribed by rational choice theory.  For example, people will pay more to increase the probability
of an uncertain event from say 0% to 1% or from 99% to 100% than they will to increase it from say 41%
to 42%.  This is so even though in each case all they are getting is a 1% increase in probability, but
somehow it looks better to get something over nothing or a sure thing over a (moderately) uncertain thing
than it is to boost your odds by an increment to a point not much different from where you were.  See
Kahneman & Reipe, supra, at 56.  
25  For a chronicling of cognitive errors displayed by various Nobel prize winning hedge fund
managers and their colleagues, see Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-
Term Capital Management (2000).
26  See Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (2000) (adverse
consequences of investor biases are exacerbated when traders “behave socially and follow each other’s
mistakes by listening to rumors or imitating their neighbors”).
27  For example, institutional investors acting as agents for individuals may choose portfolios close
to the benchmark of evaluation like the S&P 500 Index.  They may herd to avoid falling behind one another
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Attention and memory capabilities are often incorrect, but people rely on them to such a degree
as to suggest they believe they are infallible.  People thus violate probability theory, including basic
principles of Bayesian logic and statistics, all the time.24   One tendency is to predict by projecting a long
future pattern based on a short recent history rather than understanding that the short recent history could
be due to chance rather than to any emerging pattern.  A good example of the late 1990s was the tendency
to predict high rates of growth in future earnings of certain high-tech companies for several years in light
of earnings growth in the few years just passed.
These tendencies could theoretically exist across all groups of  investors, from do-it-yourself
individuals to sophisticated hedge fund managers.25  If so, this would undercut claims that non-rational
investors get canceled out by the rational.  On the contrary, it is even possible that these tendencies of
investors are followed by other investors and the biases instantiated.26   This is especially possible when
they act as agent rather than principal and therefore worry more about the measure of their performance
against their institutional peers.  This tends to promote distortion rather than enable them to offset the
noise.27  Nor can arbitrageurs be counted on, since not only is arbitrage a risky business but also because
as by picking the same stocks as each other.  They can add window dressing right before year end reports
are issued by adding stocks that have gained and dumping those that have lagged.  Such machinations
produce trades that probably have worse effects on price-value relationships than the effects of simple noise
trading. 
28  They need close substitutes to the things the noise traders trade, such as futures or options at
the local level of particular stocks or bonds, and also like all-out market indexes like the S&P 500 at the
broadest level.  While there may be some functional substitutes in the former case, they are simply absent
in the latter.  In other words, if the S&P 500 in aggregate is mispriced, there is virtually nothing any trader
can do to correct it because there are no substitutes for it.  In terms of the uncertainty in forecasting the
changing behaviors of noise traders (or their counterparts at big trading houses), Shleifer gives the example
of Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan saying one thing just as Goldman Sachs market guru Abby Joseph
Cohen is saying the opposite.  What is an arb to do?  Shleifer, supra, at 15.
29  Robert Shiller, Market Volatility (1989).
30  E.g., Warner DeBondt & Richard H. Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact, 40 J. Fin. 793
(1985) (comparing cumulative average results for winner and loser portfolios formed based on 3-year prior
periods and looking at the next 5 years).
31  These categories of stocks are sometimes called, respectively, growth and value stocks, but
these labels are essentially meaningless and should be deleted from the lexicon.  See Lawrence A.
Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate Lawyers (1997).
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to do effective arbitrage requires there to be close substitutes for the thing being arbitraged and there are
not always close (and hardly ever perfect) substitutes for securities.28
The empirical challenges to EMH were pioneered as early as 1981 by Robert Shilller, who showed
that there is too much price volatility for the EMH to be true.29  The studies continued, challenging the EMH
at its every level.  As to its claim that past prices give no profitable trading advantage (called weak form
efficiency), evidence comparing the performance of winning and losing portfolios shows that losers do way
better and winners way worse than standard risk models (like CAPM) explain.30
As to the EMH’s claim about public information (called semi-strong form efficiency), anomalies
galore infect it.  Stocks of smaller companies tend to outperform those of large; the January effect described
how prices tended to rise in January; and the piece de resistance, highly priced stocks–measured in
accounting ratios such as the market to book ratio–get lower average returns in the future than those with
lower prices.31  Ratios like those are stale information, yet these observations imply that it is possible to get
superior returns by buying the lower priced stocks (and, doesn’t this seem like common sense, anyway?).
Concerning the more general EMH claim that there should be no (and aren’t any) reactions to
noninformation, it is common to note that the stock market crash of 1987 continues to have no discretely
32  Shiller, Market Volatility, supra; Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (2000).
33  Richard Roll first showed that orange juice price changes were not fully explained by changes
in weather, Richard Roll, Orange Juice and Weather, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 861 (1984), and later adapted
that analysis to show that stock price movements are largely unaccounted for either by news about them
or changes in the price of potential substitutes. Richard Roll, R2, 43 J. Fin. 541 (1988).
34  See Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, supra, at 23 (giving the example of Ameria On Line, added
to the S&P 500 Index in December 1998, and promptly jumping 18% in price).
35  Id.
36  E.g., Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities Regulation, supra; Cunningham, From
Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes, supra.
37  See infra Part II.
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identifiable justifying cause, nor do virtually any other major market moves of dramatic proportions.32  It
will become common to note that the huge gyrations in all market indexes in the late 1990s and early 2000s
cannot be explained in terms of fundamental changes either.  Plenty of evidence shows that all sorts of stock
price movements cannot be explained in terms of changes in information about the related businesses.33
Consider finally that stocks selected for inclusion in a major stock index–such as the Standard & Poor’s
500, for example–tend to enjoy a price increase even though the inclusion alters nothing about their
probable future business performance.34
Criticisms of these rebukes to the EMH go forward on a variety of grounds.  The chief challenge
is in terms of the proper adjustment for risk.  Maybe, for example, the observation that low priced stocks
outperform high priced stocks is due to the fact that the former are riskier than the latter.  However that
may be, it seems in tension with common sense.  Other critics allege data mining, sample selection biases,
not accounting for trading costs, and other potential research defects.35  Fair as these may be, it remains
hard to deny the power of the increasing scope and magnitude of this research field.
Recognizing this is particularly important for legal scholars and other chief architects or analysts of
public policy.  The cautionary bell against the EMH has been rung before and many do seem to be
listening.36  Yet the attraction of EMH’s simplicity and elegance remains, not only among scholars but also
among courts and regulators.37  One reason for this time lag between the output of economic scholarship
and its absorption by lawyers may be the lack to date of a coherent model of market behavior that captures
these features.  Much of the economics literature for most of the past couple of decades critiquing the EMH
demonstrated weaknesses or anomalies in the model rather than developing an integrated alternative view.
That hole is now coming to be filled, however, and the next section shows a version of the model that will
be useful to corporate and securities law  scholars and policymakers in evaluating a range of rules and
positions considered in Part II.
38  Shleifer, supra, at 113-114.
39  Id. at 128 (people “tend to underweight useful statistical evidence relative to the less useful
evidence used to form their priors”).  In investing, this is sometimes called “stock price drift,” and the
evidence is similar for other news like share buybacks, dividend changes, stock splits, and seasoned equity
offerings.  Id. at 120.
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C.  An Alternative General Model
These theoretical and empirical challenges to the EMH have been combined and deepened in the
broader context of well known behavioral phenomenon.  These traits can be seen in action in market
behavior we observe.  When put together, they offer an attractive and general account of a range of typical
market activity that even the EMH has a hard time explaining.
1.  Elements
A thumb nail version of the basic outlines of the model looks like this.38  Investors start by holding
some views about the world and markets and particular industries and companies.  Some news is released
affecting a particular company, say the release of its earnings for a single quarter.  The tendency of investors
is not to react to this news in reevaluating those prior views as rationality would prescribe but instead to
exhibit conservatism.  This means investors tend to update their views about the company, and the context
in which it operates, slowly.  They cling, in other words, to the status quo, and are slow to revise the status
quo view in the face of single bits of news.  The result is under-reaction of prices to earnings news followed
by short horizon trends in those prices.39 
In contrast, when investors repeatedly receive similar types of news over a period of time, say a
series of quarterly earnings surprises for a particular company in the same direction, the tendency is to
jettison their prior views quickly in favor of a view that extends that series as the new trajectory. This is
called the representativeness heuristic, and describes the mental strategy of viewing events as typical or
representative of some specific class when statistically they are not.  So while a single earnings news flash
has modest or no impact, once a whole slew of similar sorts of reports emerges, a backlash comes.  This
can be true equally of news releases about a single company as about lots of different companies during
the same quarter or other reporting period.  The result is an overreaction in price changes to the various
elements of news.
These under-reactions and overreactions are examples of investors ignoring or at least disobeying
the laws of probability.  Such phenomena are not limited to investors and markets but rather pervade human
decision making.  The human mind searches for patterns in all sorts of events including random events.  For
example, contrary to the beliefs of many basketball fans, just because a player has been shooting lots of
3-pointers from 20 feet, doesn’t mean he is more likely to hit the next one (or less likely for that matter).
For the non-fan, just because the series of letters AAAABBBB looks less random than the series of letters
ABBBAABA each series is equally likely to have been the product of random configuration according to
40 See Amos Tversky  & Daniel Kahneman Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 Sci. 1124 (1974).   A classic example supposes there are 100 cabs in town, 85 green and 15 blue,
and one of these hits a pedestrian and flees.  A witness says the wayward cab is blue and we test his ability
to recall colors correctly and find he does so 80% of the time.  Based on this, what is the probability that
he was right in the case of the hit-and-run?  Most people choose 80%, a superficially attractive benchmark,
but the right answer is 40%, a deeper function of a base rate.  Being right 80% of the time means if the
witness were shown, for example, 85 green cabs, he’d say 68 were green and 17 were blue; and if shown
15 blue cabs he’d say 12 were blue and the others green, making a total of 29 he says were blue when only
12 of these were in fact blue.  So the probability of him being right when he says a cab he saw was blue
is 12/29 or about 40%.  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 151, 156-58 (Daniel Kahneman, et al., eds., 1982).
41    See Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, supra, at 144  A more complex variation on this example
is the bank teller problem, where a story is told about a woman bank teller suggestive of her being a
feminist.  Then people were asked is she more likely to be (a) a bank teller or (b) a feminist bank teller.
People leap to choose (b) on the strength of the feminist story imagery when this is clearly not the superior
choice since (b) is a subset of (a) and, as with the example in the text, there are way more bank tellers in
the world than there are feminist bank tellers.  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and
by Representativeness, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 84, 92-93 (Daniel
Kahneman, et al., eds., 1982).
42  Odean, supra.  The interplay of conservatism and representativeness can be seen in a standard
experiment using the toss of a coin known to be loaded.  The subject is told in advance that the coin is
biased, having either a 70% chance of heads or a 70% chance of tails rather than an even chance of either.
A rational actor would start off by assigning a 50-50 chance of in which direction–heads or tails–the coin
16
the tosses of a coin.
Another way of describing the representativeness heuristic is to say that when confronted with a
decision that could be solved according to determining probabilities, people tend to take the shortcut of
using superficial benchmarks rather than real underlying probability base rates.40  One illustration is a mental
game where subjects are told only one fact about a person–that she is artistic by nature–and asked to guess
whether the person is a sculptor or a secretary.  Most people guess sculptor though everyone knows there
are more than ten times as many secretaries as sculptors and so the more highly probable answer is
secretary.41
In the case of investing, investors tend to underestimate the likelihood that the past few surprises
are the result of chance rather than of a new business reality where more surprises are in store.  This pattern
of behavior can result not only in overreaction to such news when it arrives in a series, but can also lead
to jittery trading decisions.  A common example is the selling of one stock deemed “cold” quickly followed
by the purchase of another deemed “hot.”  Trading losses are the typical result, one study showing that on
average investors following that trading policy lost nearly 4% in the process of discard and draw.42
is biased.  As the coin is flipped and keeps coming up heads flip after flip, a Bayseian updating would call
for successively altering the probabilities from 50-50 towards a greater likelihood for heads, but doing so
in modulated increasing increments.  Subjects in this experiment regularly miss the optimal Bayesian
updating, and miss it in an asymmetrical way: at first acting conservatively (not updating the probability of
a heads tilt enough, exhibiting under-reaction) but after seeing a few heads in a row acting representatively
(updating too much and overestimating the probability of a tilt towards heads, exhibiting overreaction).  
See Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, supra, at 129-30.
This is the pattern seen in stock pricing behavior–under-reaction to discrete pieces of information
side by side with overreaction to a series of information that looks like a pattern.  See infra.
43  This point is conceptually similar to that underlying modern portfolio’s theory’s (MPT)
prescription to diversify.  But the operational differences are dramatic, including principally that MPT calls
for assembling a portfolio by reference to CAPM’s measure of risk (a price-based measure which the
EMH assumes is equal to value) rather than according to fundamental analysis of the business (a value-
based measure which behavioral finance suggests may differ from price). 
44  Kanheman & Reipe, supra, at 61.
45  Price volatility has a positive and a negative dimension, the former relating to changes in the
underlying fundamentals and the latter to other things.  Excessive price volatility refers to the amount of
negative price volatility. Shilller, Market Volatility, supra.
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In between the oscillation from under- and over-reaction to news are periodic price swings that
occur due to narrow framing of investment decisions.  A narrow framing of risk-related decisions obscures
the variability of risk that occurs when a series of related risky decisions are made as a whole than when
a series of risky decisions are viewed in isolation.  When, as is common, the relative risk of a series of
gambles is lower than the sum of the risk of each of them, each particular bet should be made in the context
of the whole.43  
Yet there is evidence that investors tend to take decisions, say on the stocks in their portfolio, one
at a time.44  It is a symptom of loss aversion noted earlier.  People ask whether they should buy Dell, say,
or sell IBM.  Even assuming the underlying fundamental values of these stocks are identifiable, the answers
may be different for different people, depending on what other investments she holds. They also may be
different depending on the degree to which the individuals are loss averse.  Failure to integrate these
decisions by adopting a broad frame helps to explain the undue amount of both buying and selling of
individual securities and hence to explain the substantial excessive price volatility of capital markets.45
This model of investor behavior capturing conservative under-reaction and representative
overreaction, mixed  along with framing volatility and loss aversion, is supplemented by a few other
cognitive biases that also seem to play a systematic role in price formation.  First, there is a tendency of
people who have chosen a voluntary course of action to resist evidence that it was ill-chosen.  This
commitment bias entails an unconscious shift in attitudes and beliefs to preserve consistency with the
46  Shilller, Irrational Exuberance, supra, at 142.
47  Kahneman & Reipe, supra, at 54  (drivers); Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, Why Every
Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 Law
& Hum. Behav. 439 (1993).  People also tend to believe that bad things (like ill health or divorce) are more
likely to happen to other people than to themselves and good things (like staying healthy and married) are
more likely to happen to themselves.  See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life
Events, 39 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 806 (1980). 
48  Notably, these biases are asymmetric: positive events are seen as the product of one’s skill and
ability while negative ones are seen as due to external forces.  This difference is seen less often in people
who are more risk-seeking than risk averse.  Kahneman & Reipe, supra, at 63.
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original decision.  It reinforces the conservatism or status quo bias in individual investors who have
purchased a particular stock.  It helps to explain why people cling to stocks whose fundamentals have
obviously deteriorated.
Second, people tend to develop self-serving beliefs, making inferences from new data that enable
them to see what they want to see in it.  This bias reinforces both the under-reaction to news associated
with conservatism and the overreaction to cumulated recurring news associated with representativeness.
In each case, the bias skews results toward seeing small changes as of low relevance and a series of them
as having great relevance.
Third, overconfidence bias is the pervasive tendency of people to think they know more than they
do and otherwise to overrate their own abilities.46   Common examples are that 80% of drivers think they
are better drivers than average (most of them must be wrong) and despite a divorce rate of 50% newly
married couples invariably believe they will not be among them (many of them must be wrong too).47   For
investors, overconfidence bias is the tendency to construe investing success as confirmation of their own
abilities even where the results are not due to any particular research, insight or skill.   It includes a tendency
to underestimate the role that chance or luck played in the process and is often coupled with commitment
and self-serving beliefs biases just noted.48 
Reinforcing these same effects is the availability bias.  This describes the tendency of people to
overweight events or circumstances that are at one’s fingertips, as it were, including due to their being
recent, or well-publicized, or traumatic, or vivid.  Thus people think, wrongly, that car accidents and
homicides are more common causes of death than diabetes or stomach cancer. In investing, this
impressionistic behavior can contribute to trends and “hot stocks.”  If all the media talk is of the Internet,
people start thinking the Internet is the place to be.  
2.  Interplay
The interplay of various cognitive biases shows patterns of price formation that are familiar.  One
49 Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, supra, at 112 ff.
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commonly seen phenomenon in market pricing histories is the occurrence of short term trends followed by
longer run trend reversals.49  The short term trends are a product of under-reaction to individual bits of
information not seen as significant, and described by the conservatism bias (the slow updating of beliefs in
the face of information).  The longer term reversals of those trends are a product of over-reaction to
cumulated bits of information perceived as manifesting conspicuous patterns, and described by the
representative heuristic.
These trends and reversals pose price-value deviations that are undesirable, even if not cataclysmic,
for they distort the capital allocation process.  Other combinations of these biases can have devastating
effects.  Overconfidence plus representativeness, for example, can lead to spectacular feedback loop
bubbles in prices.  Feedback loops describe a category of observed investment phenomena including
instances of price momentum, where prices continue moving persistently in the same direction despite either
no or opposite changes in fundamentals.  
As prices drive upward, say, investors who recently bought those stocks see their judgment as
being vindicated, form beliefs about their expertise and buy more.  As the prices move yet higher, a pattern
of price increase is detected.  Overconfidence confirms what is seen, more buying ensues and other
biases–commitment and self-serving beliefs–reinforce each other in an upward spiral, or bubble.
There are separate and external causes to the reinforcing cascades of overconfidence and
representativeness.  These include investors chasing trends or chasing each other.  These loops can be fed
by rumor, widespread publicity attendant to new technologies (say biotechnology stocks in the early 1990s
or Internet stocks in the late 1990s), or other social forces that trigger the availability bias.  They produce
cascading chain reactions that reinforce each successive link.  They are often accompanied by substantial
numbers of new investors to the market, increases in the dollar amount of new funds and borrowed funds
invested as well as increases in trading volume and price volatility.
Feedback loops also can result from technical trading strategies adopted by some investors (and
sometimes followed by others), including stop-loss orders that automatically prompt selling on price
declines and margin calls that result in the involuntary liquidation of all or part of a leveraged portfolio in a
declining market.  A conspicuous example of a feedback loop cause was the so-called portfolio insurance
popular among institutional investors in the 1980s before the crash of 1987.  It was a programmed trading
directive that, much like a stop-loss order but on a vaster scale, commanded the selling of stocks as their
prices fell.  Cascade resulted–as the falling prices  triggered the “insurance” sale, prices fell further in a
downward spiral. 
More generally, an entire class of investment phenomena rooted in the cognitive biases just
discussed and called extrapolative expectations can set in, where price declines (or rises) lead to
expectations of further price declines (or rises), which leads precisely to selling declines (or rises).
Narrative histories of price bubbles throughout financial history show this pattern repeatedly.  
50  Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, supra, at xx.  Both these aspects of the theory are necessary to
negate the EMH, for if investor sentiment were not true then no price/value distortions would occur and
if complete and unlimited arbitrage were possible then any distortions they created would be corrected and
eliminated.  Economic theorists at present exhibit a deeper and broader understanding of investor sentiment
than they do of limited arbitrage though both are adequately theorized and documented to justify treating
the EMH as overthrown.  Nevertheless, these researchers caution that their modeling capability remains
somewhat incomplete and subject to further refinement.  E.g., Shliefer, Inefficient Markets, supra.  
51   On top of all this, the argument that the increase of institutional investors (smart money) will
make the biases less rather than more significant is certainly misleading and possibly dangerous.  The only
clear primary consequence of such concentration is that decisions are made by a smaller number of people.
 The only clear secondary consequence is that their mistakes will be magnified  See Paul Gompers &
Andrew Metrick, How Are Large Institutions Different from Other Investors?  Why Do These Differences
Matter?, Working paper, Harvard Business School and National Bureau of Economic Research.
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The price-value discrepancies this behavior creates is not eliminated by sophisticated traders, for
several reasons. First, all people suffer from these biases, even sophisticated traders.  Second, even those
who do not so suffer cannot be sure they will escape the wrath of the biased errors.  Third, securities do
not have good substitutes that enable the kind of risk arbitrage that perfectly- or even substantially efficient
markets require.  Fourth, in these patterns it becomes a rational choice for arbitrageurs and other “smart
money” to join the crowd rather than try to beat it.  Far from stepping in to correct the mistakes of the noise
trader, arbs in the balooning of such bubbles can make more money by participating in the rise by buying
on the way up–and hoping to sell before the fall down.50  Accordingly, not only does investor sentiment
drive the final nail into the EMH’s coffin, this “limited arbitrage” makes the funeral complete.51
All these phenomenon also point to a more general attribute of investors in public capital markets.
They operate in these cognitive biases differently.  Some display one more than another.  Others can more
easily recognize themselves as about to commit one and avoid it.  When people operate under the
conservatism or representativeness heuristic they do not do so in exactly the same ways.  In short, people
exhibit different preferences for what is otherwise the same thing, an observation in tension with the usual
story of the EMH and the general story of rational choice theory.
The net results of these behavioral phenomena in financial economic thought are theoretical,
empirical and psychological accounts showing that prices systematically deviate from values in stock market
trading.   The story of EMH turns out to be like a fairy tale in the sense that it would be wonderful if it were
true.  Wonderful because the equation of price and value promotes optimal asset allocation–the capital
market resources of society are deployed in their most effective capacities.  
Policies that tend to align the reality with the ideal are desirable.  Recognizing justifiable skepticism
that the ideal ever will be realized, a two part program is implied by behavioral finance–a part that promotes
the aspirational tale, and a part that responds to the distance that remains between the reality and that goal.
52  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and
Cautious Supporters, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 739, 751-52 (2000).
53  See, e.g., Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra (due diligence defense of third party
professionals in securities fraud context justified as response to self-serving biases associated with officers
and directors of SEC registrants); Rachlinksi, Judging in Hindsight, supra (business judgment rule in
corporate law justified as response to hindsight bias, discussed infra).
54  See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 Cardozo L. Rev.
237 (1997).
55  It might be nice if these biases would disappear on their own through a quasi-Darwinian process
of weeding out the investors who suffer from them.   But not only is there no guarantee that they will
disappear, there isn’t much reason to believe that they will.  First, those who tend to lose money on
investment under these biases continue to generate income, some of which could continue to be invested.
Second, operating under these biases does not necessarily mean an investor will lose money in investing.
Even an irrational or nonrational investment policy can sometimes turn out to generate profits in the end,
though it could not have been rationally predicted that it would.  The consequence remains the same,
however, for price formation–prices and values separate except by sheer coincidence, and it is that
separation that entails social costs.
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II.  Investor Governance
The ultimate quest of research in cognitive psychology of which behavioral finance is a part is a
theory of decision making and a model of judgment.  It follows the research methods and programs of
psychological work in perception theory (concerned with optical illusions) and memory theory (concerned
with mnemonic failure).52  That quest is facilitated by the discovery and documentation of cognitive biases,
an understanding of how and why they are used, and consideration of when if at all they may be overcome.
The resulting general theories can then be adapted for application in particular settings, such as the model
of investor behavior presented in Part I for stock markets.
Concerning overcoming the biases, research considers first whether actors in particular settings or
the social organizations of which they are part have already adapted to them in systematic ways.  It is
possible, for example, that law has implicitly identified and corrected for various cognitive biases in the
judicial evolution of doctrine or the creation of regulatory frameworks.53  In business firms, maybe the
substantial reliance upon systems of internal control are designed to fight an intuitively perceived risk of self-
serving bias or other cognitive errors.54  While these are open subjects in broader inquiries and debates,
in the case of stock markets the evidence shows that cognitive biases affect them and the effects persist
uncorrected by other systemic adaptations (such as, say, smart money traders correcting the errors of the
noise traders).55 
The open question at the top of the social science research agenda is whether it is even possible
56  See Kahenman & Riepe, supra, at 52-53 (presenting strategies to overcome biases and
heuristics but noting that they are often correctly called cognitive illusions for their similarity to optical
illusions which also can be very difficult to overcome even after they are pointed out to you); Shiller,
Irrational Exuberance, supra, at 142 (“People can sometimes be trained out of their overconfidence”);
Jennifer Arlen, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1765, 1768-69
(1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499, 1521 (1998); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note
xxx, at [21 of draft].
57  E.g., Lionel Tiger, Optimism: The Biology of Hope 203-05 (1979). 
58  With tongue only the slightest bit in cheek, devotees of behavioral finance developed an
experiment to evaluate the exploit-ability of the recognition bias.  It is a heuristic that enables a person to
make a decision based on relative familiarity with the alternatives.  In the case of the stock market, for
example, it is a stock selection strategy based on the degree to which one recognizes a corporate name.
The researchers asked finance/economics graduate students at the Universities of Chicago and Munich as
well as randomly selected pedestrian nonprofessionals in those cities to indicate which companies they
recognized from those listed on the New York and several German stock exchanges.  The eight portfolios
that could be assembled by arraying this information were tracked over a succeeding 6-month period (e.g.,
foreign stocks most recognized by domestic professionals; domestic stocks least recognized by foreign
professionals and so on).  The result: German stocks most recognized by US nonprofessionals
outperformed the market and all others.  The intuition has a certain appeal: those companies with the
greatest penetration in the random mind or consciousness of the untutored are most likely to enjoy that
penetration carried over to their product, supply, labor and stock markets as well.  See Bernhard Borges,
et al., Can Ignorance Beat the Stock Market?, in Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Simple Heuristics
That Make Us Smart (1999) 59.
22
to overcome these biases.  Preliminary indications suggest that it is possible, at least to some extent.56   The
open question at the top of the legal scholarship agenda is whether it is desirable to employ law in the effort
to overcome them.  There are good reasons to be hesitant.
All these cognitive biases are heuristic strategies that operate at a subconscious level and carry
some obviously powerful benefits.  Conservatism performs the motivational role of stress reduction,
enabling one to sift through avalanches of information with the comfort of relatively easily separating the
important from the trivial or meaningless.  The strategies are often accurate.  After all, constancy is more
common than change.  Some biases enable the embrace of attitudes that spell success in life–the traits
associated with overconfidence such as high self esteem, optimism, confidence, and perseverence,
characterize highly successful people.57
So maybe an investor is better off using these biases.58  If investing is both a financial and an
emotional enterprise, then as much attention should be given to selections that produce the desired financial
results as to the selection that enables better emotional states.  These objectives can entail trade offs,
59  See Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology, supra note xx, at 751-52.
60  These behaviors are unusual to law in the sense that they are not readily amenable to traditional
legal tools such as prohibition or even deterrence.  Enacting laws that require a certain response to the
release of earnings announcements is silly.  It may be possible, of course, to identify certain systemic
symptoms of these behavioral biases, however, and enact laws to deter or even prohibit these.  Examples
include margin requirements and capital gains tax rates lower than ordinary rates.  See infra text
accompanying notes xx-yy for additional reasons why these devices are not highly desirable.
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exposing a tension between efficiency and happiness.59  The optimal financial strategy defined in terms of
rational choice theory may leave a person feeling uncomfortable.  An optimal choice at the outset of a
particular investment prospect can become sub-optimal if it produces emotions that lead to upsetting the
original choice at the wrong time.  
This does not necessarily mean that it would be wrong for investors to think about their cognitive
biases nor that public policy should ignore them.  All this proves is that any public policies that are intended
to influence these behaviors should be highly conscious of their possible benefits and the associated costs
of training people out of them.  Accordingly, an obvious implication is that policies designed to educate
investors about these phenomena are superior to building into legal rules incentives or disincentives towards
behavior that exhibits less rather than greater cognitive bias.60  It also means that  such investor education
must include not only tutelage in the principles of finance and their use as well as insights from behavioral
finance, but also how these axioms may collide and what to do about that. 
These points also lead to a broader preliminary conclusion.  The insights of behavioral finance will
be useful as a tool in evaluating a whole range of existing and potential future legal and policy positions in
corporate and securities law.  These would include rules governing investor-broker relationships, the timing
and content of corporate disclosure, the manner of deciding issues of corporate finance, the proof a
shareholder should be put to in alleging securities fraud, and so on, really the whole field of corporate and
securities law.  Examples of how the behavioral approach applies to such topics, and the limits of current
doctrine that perspective uncovers, are given in the next sections in this Part, after consideration is given
to the prior topic of investor education about behavioral finance. 
A.  Investor Education
Two questions are taken up in this section: the key lessons and possible remedial strategies that
investor education programs should teach and how the lessons should be delivered.   It starts with the
question of delivery.
1.   Delivery
A vast industry has emerged dedicated to investor education.  It is composed of both private
enterprises such as mutual funds, investment banking firms, and Internet investment sites as well as public
61  Partners in this mission range from governmental engines such as the Departments of Labor and
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and Social Security Administration, to trade groups such as the
Securities Industry Association, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) and the National
Association of Securities Dealers and quasi-public bodies such as the New York Stock Exchange.  See
<http://www.investoreducation.org>.
62 James A. Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and Regulation
of Investor Education, 49 Case Wes. Res. L. Rev. 105 (1998).
63  Fanto allows that the SEC could remain focused on encouraging saving and investing and
encouraging the private market to promote investor education but otherwise calls for the SEC to create a
conceptual framework project to provide a “sustained reflection on” the SEC’s role in the field.  Fanto,
supra.
64  Part of the private sector that also has a role are corporate issuers of securities.  This group too
seldom believes it has such a role.  They could easily do this on their Web sites, though registrants seem
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agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) and the Department of Labor (the
DOL).  These organizations all offer a wide variety of publications, seminars, and other materials that seek
to educate investors about investment philosophy and strategies, types and risks of various investment
products, and the environment of investing, including risks associated with financial fraud.  The SEC has
gathered much of this material together in what is presented as an integrated investor education program
called the “Alliance for Investor Education.”61
This blossoming commitment to investor education arose in the past two decades in response to
important historical and cultural forces.  These include the Baby Boom generation’s maturation that will put
pressure on Social Security programs to meet their retirement needs.  It includes steadily expanding
availability and flexibility of private self-directed retirement vehicles such as IRAs and 401(k) plans.
Cultural factors include the characteristic sense in the US of individual responsibility and the market’s
willingness to meet demands from consumers as well as public policy needs to address questions of
resource allocation and savings rates necessary for collective prosperity and economic efficiency. 
Despite the importance of these phenomena, legal scholars have paid only scant attention to the
content or vehicles of investor education.  In one of the few pieces to consider the subject at length,
Professor Fanto62 calls on the private market–including families, schools and firms–to lead the way  in the
areas of savings and investing and recommends that regulators such as the SEC stick to lessons concerning
financial fraud.  He calls for the SEC therefore to redirect its educational efforts toward fraud education
but away from its historical saving and investing education programs, which he claims simply do not
measure up to those offered in the private sector.63
There is no doubt that the private and public sectors have generated substantial educational capital
for investors and that both have a role to play.64  It is not so clear the best division of labor is as Fanto
more often to use these vehicles as a public relations device to encourage demand for their securities.   One
of the rare companies that recognizes this role is Berkshire Hathaway and its Chairman, Warren E. Buffett.
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America (1997)
[hereinafter, Cunningham, Buffett Essays] (including in documents Berkshire sent to shareholders an
“Owner’s Manual” designed to educate Berkshire shareholders about management’s business and
investment philosophy so that only those who share it would become Berkshire investors).
65   Nor, for that matter, does Fanto, who endorses as a desirable component of an investor
education curriculum the idea of developing separate mental and actual accounts for different financial
purposes, such as placing funds to be saved in a savings account, calling these “behavioral ‘tricks’”, Fanto,
supra at 129, when it is precisely these sorts of strategies that behavioral psychologists have identified as
operating at the subconscious level and that sometimes impair rational choice making (though admittedly
they also may sometimes help, see supra note xxx).
66  An extreme but instructive example of the pitfalls of leaving investor education to the private
sector is the proliferation of day trading firms in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  These companies teach
people how to trade electronically using tactics that purport to exploit minute-to-minute price changes
during the course of a trading day.  Advertising materials for these firms fraudulently touted the high profits
and low risk associated with this absurd strategy.  Regulators cracked down but not until after about 5%
of aggregate market trading was being performed by these amateurs trained by unscrupulous hawkers.  See
U.S. Senate, Day Trading: An Overview (Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Governmental
Affairs, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 16, 1999).
67  Savings Are Vital to Everyone’s Retirement Act of 1997, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146-47 (Supp. 1997)
(SAVERs Act).
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prescribes.  First, none of these delivery systems deals in any systematic way with behavioral finance.65
It may be that the private sector simply lacks the interest in this kind of investor education.  It is
sophisticated.  It is difficult.  It is relatively newly developed.  Most of all, these providers may prefer an
investor that succumbs to many of these biases, for they lead to substantial trading activity (and therefore
commissions), margin lending  (and interest income), and even greater volumes of corporate deal making
(and associated fees), all as discussed in Part II below.66  
Even were the private marketplace to be an effective provider of these lessons, there remains a
public policy dimension to their delivery.  Educated and psychologically astute investors will produce
superior allocations of capital.  This carries substantial social advantages.  It is therefore a matter of
important public policy concerning both savings and regulation of securities markets.  Accordingly, some
role for governmental engines remains, whether the SEC or other body.
Congress prescribed just such a role for the Department of Labor.  In light of evidence of a
declining national savings rate (it actually was negative in the latter part of 2000), Congress enacted the
“SAVER Act” which imposed an express educational mandate on the DOL.67  Its purpose was to advance
68  SAVERs Act, § 1146(c)(2)(E)-(F).
69   See Cunningham, Buffett Essays, supra (identifying criticism by Warren Buffett and others of
practice of both timing the market and portfolio diversification for its own sake).  In the case of emphasizing
“timing,” moreover, the lesson can be downright counterproductive by encouraging pernicious practices
such as day trading.   See supra note xx; infra text accompanying notes xx-xx. 
70  Id.
71  For a wide ranging series of discussions of issues related to sound education policy, see
Improving the Environment for Learning: Academic Leaders Talk About What Works (Janet Gail Donald
& G. Erlandson, eds., 1997).
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the public’s knowledge of savings and investment by requiring the DOL to gather and disseminate this
knowledge, including by means of a permanent Web site and by requiring the President to hold periodic
summits on the subject. This is what the SEC has been doing in more narrowly focused ways for some time.
Some of what Congress requires of the DOL was so mundane that it is easy to defend.  For
example, it requires the teaching of compound interest and the virtue of early savings to take advantage of
it.  But other topics are controversial and when mandated by Congress or the DOL, parochial.  For
example, the legislation compelled teaching the “importance” of  “diversification” and “timing” in investing,68
lessons also taught  by the SEC, even though neither idea is free from controversy in the investment
community.69
Even if Congress was mistaken in over-specifying the content of investor education, it was certainly
correct in allocating a public policy responsibility to the executive branch of the Federal government.  By
no means, however, should that cylinder be the only one hitting in the engine of investor education.  A role
remains for all the myriad sources of investor education–from family, to formal schooling, to industry
professionals, as well as governmental leaders.  All these sources must know, moreover, that while the
traditional key topics need to be covered (the time value of money, risk and return, liquidity, diversification,
indexing, specialized funds, tax matters, and asset allocation),70 they also must include a component on
investor psychology. 
In designing such a component (as well as in thinking about the content and presentation of existing
topics), consideration should also be given to developing a deeper philosophy of the educational program.
At present, the SEC’s Alliance for Investor Education is a hodgepodge of material culled from disparate
sources lacking coherence and the panoply of products on the market evince no coordinated pedagogical
philosophy or educational theory.  Successful educational programs tend to be characterized by three
attributes in the execution of their mission.71  The first and most obvious is the intrinsic function, learning for
its own sake.  This is the core of enlightenment, involving the transmission of knowledge and the skills to
use it as  edifying sensibilities.  Its quintessence may be the vaunted notion of a good liberal arts
undergraduate education.  In the case of investor education, it is the complete picture–the traditional
72  On this dimension of education, see Mary Michael Spangler, Aristotle on Teaching (2000).
73   In all cases of investor education, certification could follow the model embraced by such
specialized human endeavors as scuba diving, aviation or even automobile driving.  Each of these requires
training to do well, though in no case is a mandatory course imposed on those who would pursue the
activity.  Yet in these and other skilled but amateur-filled fields, formal certification is given that carries not
only educational satisfaction to the student but tangible advantages such as discounts on car insurance in
the case of driver training and access to superior sites and swifter service in the case of scuba and aviation.
  Investing is as specialized as these fields and yet except for the professional, there is no or limited formal
training that leads to recognized certification. 
74  These could have instrumental benefits beyond improving investor behavior and performance,
including enhancing the proprietor’s own ability to evaluate its programming and improve its philosophical
shape and substantive integrity.
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principles of finance already widely taught bolstered by the principles of behavioral finance.72
The second function is the symbolic, the conferring of tangible recognition of the rewards of
learning, as in granting diplomas, degrees and certificates, often accompanied by formal ceremony such as
graduation or commencement exercises.   The symbolic function creates both incentives and rewards for
learning.  In the case of investors, at present only those motivated by an independent desire to learn tend
to participate, a problem of self selection. Tangible manifestations of achievement may be necessary to
broaden the class.  A starting point would include a certification component to the programs.   Many of the
private programs confer tangible evidence of completion, including the programs of several on-line investor
education firms.  Neither the SEC nor the DOL have done so, however, but they should.73
The third characteristic of successful educational programs is the instrumental, entailing a distinctly
functional value to the lessons in practical application.  Examples are qualifications to enter the professions,
such as law and medicine, to advance in the job market, and so on. The instrumental dimension of a sound
investor education program would also be enhanced by such a certification program.  At present, one
theoretical instrumental advantage to investors of taking these programs is superior investing results and
another is superior investor protection.  Empirical evidence is lacking about whether these results occur.
They are certainly desirable and could be enriched not only by a certification program, but by the following
proposed expansion of the content of investor education programs.74 
2. Content
The content of investor training in behavioral finance should consist of exposition of the main biases
associated with investing and some suggestions and strategies for evaluating their influence to enable a
determination of their usefulness in particular settings.  The precise shape of the program will vary according
to the organization sponsoring it, the size of the audience, their demographic characteristics and other
factors.  Subject to that kind of detailing and refinement, the broad general outlines illustrating the highlights
75  Rachlinksi, The “New” Law and Psychology, supra, at 760 (organizing the seemingly
bewildering array of cognitive biases that are relevant to law into these three categories).
76 Id.
77  See Kahenman & Riepe, supra, at 52-53.
28
of topics and approach follows.
The list of cognitive biases is long and seems only to get longer.75  Not all these biases are relevant
to the model of investor sentiment being discussed, nor are they all relevant in the same degree. As noted,
some may even be desirable for other reasons.  While all may be of some interest to investors and of benefit
to at least some, a comprehensive and general program of investor education would stick to those that are
most relevant to the model, contribute most to market inefficiencies, and do not otherwise offer their users
substantial offsetting benefits. 
Defined this way, the key cognitive biases that should be addressed by investor education programs
boil down to three basic categories: (1) reference point related issues (including conservatism, excessive
loss aversion and frame dependence); (2) probabilistic analysis issues (including representativeness and
overconfidence); and (3) mental errors (brain functioning outside of one’s awareness, principally anchoring,
regret and addiction).76  In each category, the lessons would consist of identifying and describing the set
of biases and introducing steps that can be taken to reduce any adverse effects that adopting them may
have.
Reference Point Related Issues.  At the most general level, neutralizing the errors of cognitive bias
relating to reference point issues calls for recognizing them.  This requires first a simple introduction to them
and how they can operate.  To correct for them then requires some mechanism to spot them when they
come up.  Some are easier to recognize than others of course.  Conservatism bias is probably easier to
recognize in general terms than are problems of excessive loss aversion or framing dependence for
example.  Once investors are alert to watch for the conservatism bias–impaired or delayed responses to
new information–they can begin to develop a habit of reflection and consideration upon receiving new
information.  
Excessive loss aversion in connection with holding the losers (the disposition effect) can best be
addressed by combining three separate lessons.  The first is to recognize that risk of loss is a major variable
and factor in investment selection but that the relevant loss varies by reference point, only one of which is
the price paid (others include year end price, losses that would have been realized on alternative
opportunities and so on).  Making a habit of noting the loss reference point is valuable.77  Second, to
counteract the disposition effect in particular, investors should be trained to think hard about non-investment
examples where the clearly superior strategy was to “cut one’s losses.” 
Third, and more generally, investors should specify for themselves when they buy a security the
78  This was a common error of portfolio insurance strategies adopted by many major institutional
investors in the late 1980s that contributed to accelerating the market crash of October 1987.  See
Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes, supra note xx.
79  An example is provided, supra note xx.
80  Kahneman & Riepe, supra, at 57.  Superior framing can also help to avoid excessive loss
aversion.  Emphasis should be given to the benefits of statistical aggregation–that is, betting less on the big
risky chances and betting more on the smaller so-so risky deals and knowing that throughout the long series
of decisions one will make over an investment life time, you will win some and you will lose some and what
matters is not so much each one but all of them together.
A limiting point to consider in evaluating frame breadth, however, is what disciplinary value different
people exact from narrow rather than broad frames.  If a separate mental account for a child’s collegiate
savings enables a parent to allocate more to the account and leave it untouched than would be possible if
those amounts were first applied to consumption (say buying a car), there may be reason to stick with that
heuristic–better to have something for college than nothing all.  But if a sufficient level of discipline can be
used with a broader lens to allocate the same amount to that account in future periods, then more money
will be available.  
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circumstances under which they would sell it.  These circumstances should relate principally to the
fundamental characteristics of the business rather than to its stock price but could also include price.  In any
event, they should be clearly articulated to avoid inadvertently identifying a chance event (say the entire
market breaks one day, sending the subject stock to nadir low prices).78
The way to deal with frame dependence problems is to notice that decisions can be described in
broader terms or narrower terms.  A choice between two problems posed in terms of total wealth or in
terms of gains or losses from the particular decisions that were to be made produces different selections
despite having identical economics.79  When the framing is done more narrowly, as in terms of gains or
losses, the tendency is to select choices that can produce weaker (less profitable) positions.  Accordingly,
decisions and other questions concerning investment that can be put in broader frames should be–usually
total wealth or the annual amount of income available from an annuity investment, say, rather than gains or
losses.80
Probabilistic Analysis Issues.  The whole range of biases that are a function of limited cognition
of probability (such as the representativeness heuristic and overconfidence) can best be addressed,
obviously, by enhancing one’s ability to judge probabilities accurately.  Decision analysts prescribe doing
so by thinking of uncertain variables in terms of confidence intervals.  Take an example from Kahneman
and Riepe:
What is your best estimate of the level of the Dow Jones one month from today?  Next pick a high
level, such that you are 99% sure (but not absolutely sure) that the Dow Jones a month from today
will be lower than that.  Now pick a low level, such that you are 99% sure (but no more) that the
81  Kahneman & Riepe, supra, at 53.
82  This is why when someone tells you “I am 99% sure,” you should translate that as “75-80%
sure.” 
83  Kahenman & Riepe, supra.
84  Id.  A wonderful study described to a group a set of circumstances existing in an obscure battle
between Britain and the Gurkas in Nepal in the 19th century.  Four possible outcomes of the next stage in
the battle were then noted as possible.  Five sub-groups were created, four of which were each told that
one of the four outcomes in fact happened and the fifth was not told which happened.  Respondents were
asked to gauge how likely they had thought each outcome was.  The four informed groups responded
disproportionately that the outcome they were told happened was most likely to happen.  See Baruch
Fishhoff, Hindsight is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under
Uncertainty, 1 J. Exp. Psych. Hum. Perception & Perf. 288, 289-90 (1975).
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Dow Jones a month from today will be higher than that.81
Following the instructions, you state as having a 1% probability each that the Dow will exceed your
high guess and fall short of your low guess.  In statistical terms, you have set a 98% confidence interval of
where the Dow will be.  You may turn out to be correct (the actual Dow is within your confidence interval)
or it may be higher (called a high surprise) or lower (called a low surprise).
People who are well calibrated in judgments of probability have a success rate of at least 98% (it
is okay to be off 1% in each direction) but most people’s success rate is more like 75-80%.82 Evidence
shows that calibration rates can be improved by those who face similar problems daily, make explicitly
probabilistic predictions in terms of confidence intervals, and get quick and accurate feedback on
outcomes.83  Including these lessons, and developing the prescribed habits, would be a prudent addition
to investor education programs.
Mental Errors.    Another general way people can be sensitized to their cognitive biases is through
receiving feedback from decisions that reveal their presence.  The good news in the case of stock market
investors is this feedback is pervasive; the bad is that the feedback itself is not always easy to identify (is
poor portfolio performance due to investor’s misstatement of probability or just the plain unlucky
happenstance of the improbable occurring?).  Recognition of the most common and costly mental errors
investors are prone to would go a long way to help investors avoid repeating them.  A valuable component
of a behavioral finance investor education would concentrate on introducing just a few of these.
First, one of the most powerful cognitive errors of judgment is the hindsight bias, a “tendency to
think that one would have known actual events were coming before they happened, had one been present
them or had reason to pay attention.”84  In terms of financial markets, the most persuasive, daily and
multiplying evidence of the hindsight bias is in “market-wraps,” financial news shows about the market after
85 See Kahneman & Reipe, supra, at 55.
86  To see this, suppose that on January 1, 2000 Holder owns 1000 shares of Procter & Gamble
(P&G) and Trader owns 1000 shares of Gillette.   In January 2002, Trader decides to sell her Gillette and
buy P&G and Holder considers selling his P&G and buying Gillette but ultimately decides not to.  By
January 2004, Gillette has performed very well compared to P&G so that if Trader had not made the
switch she’d be better off by $10,000 and if Holder had made the switch he’d be better off by $10,000.
In effect, these two are in the same position as each other, yet most people say Trader is likely to feel more
regret.  
There are two reasons.  The broader one is that Trader made a stronger form of what looks like
a mistake–a commission, consisting of a decision and an affirmative action.  Holder made the weaker  sin
of omission, consisting of a decision, to be sure, but not any other affirmative action.  The second reason
is the difference between outright losses and mere opportunity cost.  Outright losses are felt more acutely
than missed opportunities. Kahneman & Reipe, supra, at 63. 
Regret is also amplified by some of the cognitive errors catalogued above. The hindsight bias, for
example, that leads an investor to believe he could have avoided a loss, exacerbates feelings of regret.
Investors feel for not having seen the writing on the wall and acted to protect a bad result later on.  
Also noteworthy is that of the minority of people who express greater regret over their omissions
rather than commissions, a disproportionate percentage of them were also more risk seeking than average
and among this group a disproportionate percentage assigned virtually no role at all to chance in the
outcomes of their decisions, exhibiting an “illusion of control” that itself is a cognitive bias.  Id. 
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it closes, and the daily press, all reporting on why the market moved the way it did earlier in the day or the
day before.  Such commentary as the “market moved sideways because investors were skittish about third
quarter earnings reports of technology companies” suggests not only that it was possible for the speaker
to gather such information but also that the market action was so reasonable that it could have been
predicted before hand.  But if the market could have been predicted in that way, then lots of people would
have acted differently, and the actual market behavior that day would have differed too.85  Investors
consuming this daily diet should be forearmed with knowledge that it is an illusion.
Second, as the examples in Part I suggested, there is a substantial emotional aspect to investing,
a conclusion made even clearer when you turn your attention away from the moments of decision and
towards living with those decisions.  The most striking emotion associated with the consequences of
investment decisions is regret.  Regret produced by uncertainty differs depending on whether a decision
resulted in an affirmative action (“commission”) or a choice of not taking some action one considered
(“omission”). Most people experience and understand regret to be greater over commissions more than
over omissions.86  Training to acquaint investors with this distinction would go a long way towards avoiding
regret.  Training to overcome such regret generally requires attention to its link to loss aversion.  It calls for
learning about one’s own loss averseness, gauging the slope of one’s value function (comparing the gain
function to the loss function) and sticking with investments that meet one’s willingness to bear losses and
87  See infra text accompanying notes xx-xx (considering this problem in the context of the broker-
investor suitability rule).
88  Edward E. Joyce & Gary C. Biddle, Anchoring and Adjustment in Probabilistic Inference in
Auditing, 19 J. Acct. Res. 120, 122-23 (1981).
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thereby to minimize regret.87
Third, the folk wisdom caution against the power of suggestion is called by social psychologists the
problem of anchoring.  This comes up in finance and related negotiations all the time and can be seen in
a simple experiment.  Two groups of accountants are asked about the relative incidence of fraud among
major companies, one group whether they thought more than 10 of every 2000 companies had the problem
and the other whether more than 200 of every 2000 had it.  Not surprisingly, but certainly induced by the
anchors contained in the question, when thereafter asked to estimate the number of companies having fraud
problems the latter group responded with significantly higher guesses than the former.88   For investors,
anchoring can orient analysis towards the present or recent price of stocks and away from underlying
values.  Even among those who exercise independent judgment in estimating value using fundamental
methods of analysis may be led toward a particular end of their range in light of present price data or price
data recently examined. 
Fourth and finally, a couple of more obviously dysfunctional limits are bad habits and addictions.
Some trading decisions or activities are performed simply because one is used to doing it a particular way
as a matter of repetition.  In many contexts, such performance habits can be cost savers, as in taking the
same route to work at the same hour of the morning, and thus amount to good habits.  Rarely is this so in
investing, with the possible exception of dividend reinvestment plans and except for the good habits of
reflection and attention being discussed
Worse, however, are addictions, actions taken not simply as a product of ordinary repetition but
as a product of powerful compulsions that coerce an action against an opposing rational sense that it is
undesirable.  Excessive drinking and eating fall into this category, as does any amount of smoking, and at
least some forms and amounts of gambling, including all such activity that bears on the price formation
process in public capital markets.
In the case of each of these phenomena, investor education would be substantially improved simply
by covering the topics–pretty much as described here–as part of the course.  More advanced courses or
materials could amplify them further.  Even this level of awareness of these mental shortcuts should enable
an investor to evaluate intelligently whether using one or taking the long route is better when facing a
particular decision.
__________
Promoting the identify of stock prices and business values is socially desirable and may be aided
through superior investor education programs that emphasize not just the basic principles of investing that
89  The New York Stock Exchange has its own version of the suitability rule called a “know the
customer rule”, NYSE Rule 405, reprinted in NYSE Guide (CCH) ¶2405 (1999), understood to impose
a duty on the broker to insure that recommendations reasonably relate to the investor’s particular needs
and situation.  See Richard W. Jennings & Harold Marsh, Jr., Securities Regulation 643 (6th ed. 1987).
90  Some states also have adopted fair dealing and suitability rules for brokers, but along lines
substantially similar to those discussed in the text. See Joseph C. Long, Blue Sky Law § 7.07 (1998); Jerry
W. Markham & Thomas Lee Hazen, Broker-Dealer Operations Under Securities and Commodities Law
(1999).  Liability for failure to comply with the principles underlying such rules has also been found under
Section 10b(5) of the Exchange Act.  E.g., Cruse v Equitable Securities of New York, Inc., 678 F Supp
1023, 1031-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Brown v E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir.
1993); O'Connor v R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F2d 893, 897 (10th Cir.1992); Miley v. Oppenheimder
& Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594 (2d Cir.
1978).
91  For example, NASD Rule 2310(a), the main suitability rule, provides: “In recommending to a
customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for
believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed
by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.”  NASD
Rules of Fair Practice, Rule 2310(a), NASD Manual NASD (emphasis added).  Most interpretations
emphasize financial aspects.  E.g., In re Application of Rangen, 64 SEC Docket 628, Release No. 34-
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have been accepted for decades but also the role and significance of psychology that has been neglected
until recently.  This education will not eliminate all errors or their effects, however, so attention also must
be paid to potential reforms in fields that most directly relate to investors and their behavior.  Those fields
are potentially very numerous, but let’s start by tackling three of the most dramatic in terms of importance
and immediacy: market regulation, corporate finance, and shareholder litigation.
B.  Market Regulation
Investor education rather than investor regulation is probably the best way to respond to the
increasing recognition of the substantial role that cognitive biases play in investor behavior.  Nevertheless,
the insights from behavioral finance do suggest a couple of areas where existing legal rules should be
changed.
1.  Local Educational Subvention: Suitability and Churning Rules
Brokers owe a general duty of fair dealing to their clients and a special duty of suitability in
recommendations on investment decisions.  These duties are defined principally by regulation of the NASD
and other SROs,89 as well as administrative and judicial interpretations.90  The regulations and the
interpretations all tend to define fair dealing and suitability solely in financial rather than psychological
terms.91  Behavioral finance suggests, however, that while financial aspects of investing are obviously of
38486 (Apr. 8, 1997) (whether recommendation was consistent with “financial situation and needs”).
Though psychological variables have not been a factor, sometimes among the financial aspects factors such
as experience and complexity have been considered.  E.g., In re David Allen, NYSE Hearing Panel
Decision 96-147 (Dec. 19, 1996) (suitability in terms of investment objectives, financial resources, and
experience); In re Application of Clyde J. Bruff, 52 SEC Docket 1266, Release No. 34-31141, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep.  (CCH) ¶85,029 (Sept. 3, 1992) (“high degree of financial risk and complexity”).
92  Legal scholarship concerning the suitability rule proliferated in relation to derivative securities
and sophisticated investors during the 1990s but was otherwise not a richly plowed field, with a few notable
exceptions: Robert N. Rapp Rethinking Risky Investments for that Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role for
Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers,24 Ohio N.U.L.(1998);
Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics
About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 627 (1996); Seth C. Anderson &
Donald Arthur Winslow, Defining Suitability, 81 Ky. L. J. 105 (1993).  None of this work deals with the
psychological portion of the suitability equation.
93  NASD Rule 2310(b) provides that “Prior to the execution of a transaction recommended to a
non-institutional customer, other than transactions with customers where investments are limited to money
market mutual funds, a member shall make reasonable efforts to obtain information concerning: (1) the
customer’s financial status; (2) the customer’s tax status; (3) the customer’s investment objectives; and (4)
such other information used or considered to be reasonable by such member or registered representative
in making recommendations to the customer.”  NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Rule 2310(b), NASD
Manual.
94  The forms vary by firm, sometimes widely.  See Anderson & Winslow, supra note xx, at 119
(reporting their survey of four firms calling, respectively, for: (1) prioritizing income, growth and speculation
as “objectives” and reporting investment experience as none, low, moderate or high; (2) selecting
appreciation with risk, speculation and income with safety, income with risk or tax reduction; (3) income,
growth or total return as goals and aggressive, moderate or conservative in risk; and (4) prioritizing income,
investment grade, capital gains, and speculative).
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great importance, there is a substantial place for psychological aspects that may differ.  Accordingly,
consideration should be given to broadening the concepts underlying the fair dealing and suitability
requirements to include a psychological component.92
As a practical matter, such a step would not differ all that much from what happens in most cases
already.  When an investor opens a brokerage account the broker is required to take reasonable steps to
obtain information about the customer’s financial and tax status and investment objectives, as well as other
information that could be useful in making recommendations.93  Brokers implement this requirement in part
by including on new account forms lines to indicate data such as income and net worth and boxes to
indicate investment objectives by categories such as income or growth.94  The broker typically reviews this
data with the customer in a conversation.
95  For example, behavioral finance explanations of the equity risk premium indicate that on average
investors weight losses more heavily than gains by a factor of about 2.5, a good proxy for the normal value
function.  See supra text accompanying notes xx-xx.  More loss averse investors would have higher value
functions.
If this sounds at all fanciful, it should be noted that it is no more peculiar to ask an investor what her
emotional orientation towards gain versus loss is than it is to ask her to specify her investment objectives
in terms of categories such as income, investment grade, growth, or speculation.  Indeed, these labels may
have far less meaning than labels defined in terms of emotional states.  
In principle and to avoid creating substantial administrative costs or burdens, it would not be
necessary for the client to undergo any extensive diagnosis.  It should be possible for a client to form her
own judgments of her psychological profile based on the kind of training discussed above in connection with
an investor education program.  However, it is equally possible and certainly within the range of passing
a cost-benefit test to call for the firm to evaluate a client using the kinds of behavioral testing and
experimentation researchers in behavioral finance have used in developing the theories discussed in Part
I.
96  If EMH were true, suitability could be defined according to the linear relationship of risk
specified by investor goals on the one hand and expected return from particular investment or type defined
by CAPM on the other.  See Anderson & Winslow, Suitability, supra, at 110-111.  Such a linear
relationship becomes irrelevant, however, once it is clear that EMH is not true, and particularly when a
major reason it is not true is due to loss aversion and asymmetric value functions.
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It would not be hard in such a meeting, or on the account form, to call attention to aspects of
investor psychology in addition to investor financial condition.  An applicant would check boxes according
to investment objectives and also according to psychological profile.  As with investment objectives, firms
could choose which of various psychological factors seem most relevant to their understanding of what
investments would be suitable for a particular client. Of all the biases and factors that one could possibly
ask about, however, one’s degree of loss aversion is striking for its relevance, reliability, and accessability.
Loss aversion relates directly to problems of regret (a universal characteristic of claimants in non-suitability
cases), it is a good indicator of the sorts of securities that would or would not make the investor
comfortable, and it is relatively easy to elicit by reflection or brief interview.  It can be expressed in terms
of one’s value function, the degree to which the person differs in her weighting of gains versus losses.95
These profiles would then be considered in relation to otherwise stated investment objectives.  In
some cases the two may have to be reconciled according to some trade offs.  For example, an investor
checking “speculation” as her objective and also indicating a steep gain:loss value function would clearly
need to reconsider at least one of her choices.  This could be done by the client at the outset or could be
amended in the course of investment selection.  In any event, the suitability of investment would be
measured in terms of both financial objectives and psychological profile.96  
This is, after all, what people are usually worried about in thinking about the uncertainties of
investment and is a major part of what they complain about afterwards when things don’t turn out the way
97  Exchange Act Rule 15c1-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-7.  Churning rules apply only to accounts
over which a broker has control.  A violation of the anti-churning rules may also be a violation of a broker’s
standards of conduct under Section 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78e(c)(1), as well as Exchange Act Rule
10b(5).  E.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham Co., 430 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1970).
98  The simplest computation divides the total dollar amount of purchases by the average monthly
ending balance invested in securities.
99  Some sophisticated techniques have been urged that apply portfolio theory to churning, an
approach rooted in the EMH.  See Donald Arthur Winslow & Seth C. Anderson, A Model for Determining
the Excessive Trading Element in Churning Claims, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 327 (1990).  These obviously do not
work when EMH is false, particularly where the reasons it is false include psychological factors.
100  Yet another approach is to compare the observed turnover ratio to the observed turnover rate
of mutual funds pursuing comparable investment objectives.  Winslow & Anderson, supra.   Suppose the
subject account’s turnover rate is 4.  You then compare this rate to the mean turnover rate of mutual funds
adopting similar objectives (such as “growth and income”) as their investment objective during a
comparable period.  Suppose this is 53 with a standard deviation of .55.  This means that the subject
account turnover rate exceeds the norm by 5.8 standard deviations.  The likelihood that the actual rate
exceeds that norm purely as a random matter is exceedingly slight, and that accounts operated in
accordance with the investment objectives would exhibit that high level of turnover.  Accordingly, a strong
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they had expected.  The approach, therefore, would certainly change the sorts of investment
recommendations that are made and decisions that result.  The outcome, however, would reduce the
frequency of good faith, after-the-fact, objections to broker advice and the incidence of formal disputes
alleging violation of the suitability rules. From that point of view, this device should have the effect of
protecting both the investor and the broker and at the same time promoting optimal capital allocations.
Defining suitability rules in both financial and psychological terms bears on the related set of broker-
investor regulations concerning churning, excessive trading done in an account.97   Brokers are not
permitted to trade excessively in accounts in a manner that appears intended more to generate trading fees
and commissions than to meet investment objectives of the client.   
The commonest means of assessing whether trading is so excessive as to constitute churning is
calculating the annual turnover rate for the account.98   The rate is then compared to general baseline
indicators of trading levels on a continuum between light, moderate, and excessive trading.  The commonest
metric is the so-called 2-4-6 rule, that a rate over 2 indicates the possibility of churning; over 4 indicates
a presumption of churning; and over 6 conclusively establishes churning.99   Whether applying this rule or
taking a less formulaic and more contextual approach, it is also common to evaluate the observed turnover
rate in relation to the investment objectives.  An account intended to engage in short-term price arbitrage
would ordinarily have a much higher turnover rate than one intended to preserve capital and accumulate
income.100
claim can be made on these numbers that this activity constituted churning. In evaluating churning claims
by incorporating psychological profiles, comparisons to the mutual fund industry would not be workable
except to the extent the psychological profile of the fund were known.
101  That nexus also appears in some of the cases, for some courts have held that a showing of non-
suitability is an element of a churning case.  See Jennings & Marsh, supra note xx, at 639-41.   Other
courts distinguish the offenses.  E.g., Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1990).
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But if we also recognize that substantial psychological forces are at work in the market in aggregate
and in the case of individual investors, it may be most useful to compare particular levels of trading in an
account not with market benchmarks but against the psychological profile of the investor developed during
the suitability review.  In other words, questions of churning would be related directly to questions of
suitability, which in turn are keyed off not only investment objectives but also by psychological factors.101
 
Rules of thumb might still be useful, and could draw on the 2-4-6 rule, for example.   The intuition
behind that rule is sound in the sense that it furnishes a channeling directive for the inquiry ranging from
dismissing a case at levels under 2 to granting summary judgment for the plaintiff at levels over 6 and a
degree of evaluation in between.  Once a psychological profile is included, the intuition would still hold
though the calibration would differ.
Trading is risky but for an investor who identifies arbitrage as his investment “objective” and
discloses a flat gain-loss value function, it would not seem unreasonable to raise the 2-4-6 scale up to as
much as 5-8-11.  At the opposite end of the scale, an investor seeking preservation of capital and
disclosing an acutely steep gain-loss value function might be better served by a churning framework of 1-2-
3.  In short, courts otherwise content with adopting and applying the 2-4-6 rule or similar abstract formula,
could vastly improve the accuracy of their analysis by adjusting the general standards for the particular
suitability defined by each investor’s combined financial and psychological profile.
2.  Systemic Manifestations and Public Policy: Day Trading, Margin Trading and Panic
These proposals to broaden the rules relating to suitability and churning to include psychological
profiles can themselves be seen as an element of an investor education program, for the investor would be
called upon to pause upon opening a new brokerage account to consider her emotional orientation towards
investing.  Neither sort of investor education program is likely to eliminate cognitive biases or their effects
and it would probably not be desirable to do so in any event.  
What may be tempting, then, is to consider stronger action to address systemic manifestations of
the consequences of collective cognitive biases.  These general manifestations include such episodes as the
explosion of day trading in the late 1990s and early 2000s, obviously a product at least in part of
overconfidence and representativeness biases on a mass scale.   Day trading is the practice of buying and
selling stocks during a single trading day with the goal and result of holding no stocks overnight.  It is an
102  See North American Securities Administrators Association, Report of the Day Trading Project
Group: Findings and Recommendations (Aug. 9, 1999) (on file with author) (cataloguing enforcement
examples).
103  See Senate Report: Day Trading, supra note xx (testimony of SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt as
well as remarks of Senator Collins expressly disclaim any intension to forbid day trading while also
expressly condemning the practices of many of its promoters and characterizing the practice as a foolish
high risk strategy).
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extraordinarily risky activity that became quite popular during the latter 1990s and early 2000s, suggesting
that thousands of people (and maybe more) suffered from an inability to calculate probabilities accurately
and other cognitive biases.
The mass appeal of this activity compelled at least the asking of the question whether public policy
could do anything to stem it.  The epidemic caught the attention of regulators, including the SEC which
warned against it and the Senate which published a report about its hazards, along with statistical evidence
showing how unlikely it is for a person to make money in the process.   Neither the Congress nor the SEC
took any additional formal action to ban day trading or even to discourage it.  Nor could they.  
There is no practical way for a regulation to forbid the actual practice of day trading.  After all, at
the level of practice it consists solely of effecting trades in an open market.  What the regulators throughout
the country could and did do is enforce existing laws against touters of day trading who engaged in false
advertising and other deceptive trade practices to promote the activity.102  Indeed, it was precisely this kind
of force in the market place that investor education programs emphasizing biases such as overconfidence
would be intended to counteract.  But outright banning of day trading was not seriously on the agenda.103
This policy of persuasion may reduce the incidence of day trading, but educating people about the
pitfalls of short-termism has always been a tough public policy battle concerning investment.  Indeed the
proliferation of day trading is an example of this commonly lamented characteristic of limited rationality in
American equity markets.   There has always seemed to be a relatively greater emphasis on the near term
compared to the long term.  This is so even though in stocks, the near term (today through the next couple
of years) is riskier than the far term (five years and beyond) in that there is greater variability of returns to
individual stocks, the percentage of losing time periods compared to winning time periods in the major
indexes is greater, the volatility is greater, and so on.  
Yet most (maybe almost all) people check and recheck their purchases and sales and rebalance
their portfolios over the near term.  This habit has only gotten worse over the past two decades, with the
advent of the Quotron in the early 1980s that enabled people to stop by any branch brokerage office to
check their quotes at lunch time to the ubiquity of the Yahoo! Finance Internet site on people’s desk tops
in the late 1990s to check them every five minutes.  Apart from costing substantial sums of money in
transaction fees and taxes, this preference for the short term view both makes people see greater risks than
there really are (which can translate into missing opportunities within their tolerance for risk, called myopic
104  Kanheman & Riepe, supra note xx, at 62 (citing Benartzi & Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion).
105  Apart from tax policies such as lower capital gains taxes, a broader possible prescription would
impose differential transaction taxes on purchases and sales of securities that occur in a single day.  After
all, it would be the rare day on which it is rational for an investor who decides in the morning that buying
a share of IBM is a good idea in the afternoon to decide that it is not. Most underlying fundamentals do not
change that quickly, nor do most news reports of such alteration disseminate in that short time period.
Apart from ignoring that rare case that admittedly maybe should not be ignored, however, the larger
problem with such a regulation is its inability to discriminate between day traders acting noisily and under
cognitive biases from smart money traders such as arbitratgeurs who notice price/value differentials that
should be corrected.  Discouraging such trades in one market may also exacerbate problems of mispricing
on others, for it reduces the range of opportunities an arb has to hedge risks he takes in one market by
offsetting positions in another.
106  Suppose two brokerage clients.  Mr. Conservative opens a regular account depositing $5,000
and buys X Company’s securities with that amount and Ms. Aggressive opens a margin account depositing
$5,000 cash and borrowing an additional $5,000 to buy $10,000 of X Company’s securities on day one.
A year later X Company’s stock has doubled in price and both Conservative and Aggressive sell their
shares.  Conservative has yielded a 100% return while Aggressive yielded a 200% return (less interest on
the margin loan).  Suppose instead a year later X Company’s stock has dropped in price by half and both
our clients sell anyway.  Conservative has lost 50% while Aggressive has lost 100% (plus interest on the
margin loan).  In light of the exploding volume of margin debt outstanding in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
it seems doubtful that all investors who use margin accounts are aware of the downside potential.
107  From 1996 to 1999, margin debt at on-line brokerage firms rose nearly five-fold and doubled
among New York Stock Exchange member firms.  During the decade of the 1990s, margin debt as a
percentage of total consumer debt quadrupled from 4% to 16%.  Yet many do not understand that margin
loans are not like other consumer loans.  Gretchen Morgenson, Buying on Margin Becomes a Habit, The
New York Times, March 24, 2000.  See also  Gretchen Morgenson, Stock-Trading Cheerleader Now
Faces $45 Million Debt, The New York Times, April 19, 2000 (chronicling travail of promoter of margin
and day trading when crash in high tech sectors of market led to margin calls against him).
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loss aversion) and, shockingly, compound those risks by active trading over that shorter and riskier period
(in effect, converting risks to reality!)104   Yet proselytizing,  and possibly some incremental tax policy, are
about the only available public policy avenues to seek reorientation of this attitude and this is no less true
of problems such as day trading.105
Another symptom of the short term view that reveals additional plagues of many American traders
is margin trading.  It is the practice of borrowing funds from a broker with whom one holds an account in
order to buy securities with the proceeds.   It purports to exploit the leverage of lending but can have
financially dire consequences when securities market prices turn downward.106  In behavioral terms,
excessive margin trading seems to be a product of overconfidence, at least when levels of debt compared
to investment reached the proportions they did in the United States in the late 1990s and early 2000s.107
108  The Federal Reserve’s general regulatory powers relate to the money supply and interest rate
(supply and cost of credit) in the economy with responsibility for monitoring whether and to what extent
credit is being used for “the speculative carrying of or trading in securities, real estate, or commodities” and
has power to regulate to minimize such speculative use of credit.  The Fed exercises that power by limiting
the amount holders of securities may borrow upon securities, set as a percentage of their current market
value, a figure that has range from 45-60% and is currently at 50%.  This regulation is an exercise in serving
as a “stabilizing and corrective influence” against speculation for the broader economy.  These limits apply
only to the initial loan, and do not require adding collateral or reducing the loan amount (these limits are
imposed by brokerage firms [and SROs?].  The rationale of the Fed’s involvement is that while the broker
is the nominal lender to the customer, the broker obtains the funds in turn from banks and changes in bank
funds directly affect the bank's reserve position. Substantial increases in demand for margin credit can
produce the same for bank debt and thus affect money rates.  The Fed is thus able to restrict the use of
bank funds for stock market speculation without restricting the volume of credit available for commercial
and industrial needs or raising its cost. 
109  Regulation T governs credit extensions by securities brokers and dealers, including all members
of national securities exchanges.  Regulation T, Margin Credit Extended by Brokers and Dealers, CFR.
These parties cannot extend credit to their customers except by loans secured by publically traded
securities, mutual funds or certain foreign stock. At inception, the amount of the loan may not exceed the
percentage of current market value permitted by the Fed from time to time.
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That can help to foster market bubbles that not only push prices above values but also pose substantial risks
of uncontrollable financial fall out and devastation once the bubble bursts.
This seems an easy context in which to justify regulatory intervention, not so much because of its
effect on the stock market as such or investors individually, but because of the broader macroeconomic
context of which it is a part.  The volume of margin debt relates directly to the aggregate supply and cost
of credit in the economy, and therefore has an important bearing on the level of domestic production and
on price inflation.  It was for this reason that Congress allocated the power to regulate margin lending not
to the SEC, say, but to the Federal Reserve Board.108
Indeed it was the Federal Reserve that first publicized concerns in the late 1990s about the effect
of increasing levels of margin debt on the overall supply of credit in the economy.  While individuals did not
seem collectively to get the initial messages, the private market responded with some brokerage firms
beginning to prohibit credit extensions for certain customers or for certain types of securities.  Fed
proselytizing and even regulatory tightening of its margin credit rules are apt responses to the problems of
excessive margin borrowing.109  
Yet it remains true that no amount of proselyting or Fed policymaking  is going to change everyone
to eliminate the systemic manifestations of cognitive biases.  Nor would this necessarily be desirable, not
only because of the ways that these biases may be beneficial to those exercising them but also because
financial history and economic theory both strongly suggest that governmental efforts to control market
110  See generally Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 741, 755-57 (2000) (summarizing this “cognitive error” theory of market crashes as
proceeding differently in the details of various crashes but generally following a structure or pattern moving
from an exogenous catalyst creating new profit opportunities, the expansion of credit to exploit those
opportunities, euphoria at the resulting rise in financial asset prices and a consequent mania, a panic that
things have gotten out of hand, and a crash that proves the point).  Partnoy notes two weaker alternatives
to the cognitive error theory of market crashes: (1) moral hazard problem created by financial guarantees
in the economy ranging from deposit or securities insurance to probable governmental bailouts (weaker
because the presence of these devices has reduced the incidence of crashes in the US) and (2) information
asymmetry under which price-value discrepancies are caused by investors lacking sufficient information
about value and can lead to market spirals by creating incentives for issuers and existing shareholders to
keep negative information quiet (weaker because it draws on the theory of investor cognitive error).  Id.
at 757-62.
111  Apart from the specific question posed in the text concerning whether law should step in when
markets begin to crash, legal rules and social norms do play important roles in averting the bubbles that
precede crashes and keeping the number of bubble-crash patterns to a minimum.  Among the operative
forces having this effect are legal rules that reinforce a culture of trust in markets, corporate governance
rules that reduce the costs of the separation of ownership from control, rules that permit free markets to
operate according to their own economic laws of supply and demand, and laws creating and governing the
operation of lenders of last resort.  These can all fail of course.  The question is when they do, should law
do anything more?
112  Circuit breakers have triggered on various financial markets on many occasions since enacted.
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activity through policies of price control or stabilization are doomed to fail.  Alas, some lessons can only
be learned the hard way: by experience.
That raises a final question in this section concerning manifestations of collective cognitive biases:
market crashes and what, if anything, regulators should do about them.  Market crashes are described quite
well by the behavioral model outlined in Part I.  They are preceded by a market bubble, driven by
psychological forces such as overconfidence and reinforced by those such as representativeness.  They are
sparked by biases such as overreaction, which are reinforced by those such as hindsight bias and regret.
In short, people get carried away on the way up and carried away on the way down.110  
Should government step in on the way down?111  Through the 1987 crash, the regulatory posture
had mostly been to let the cards fall where they may.  In October of that year, stocks steadily declined
manifold and on a single day dropped by nearly 1/4.  No regulatory mechanisms were triggered to halt the
hemorrhaging.  In the wake of the crash, the major national securities exchanges instituted circuit breakers
to prevent panics. They trigger when specified price-level changes are reached and then impose a trading
halt for a specified period of time–a cooling off period.112 
113  Another approach would be to respecify the circuit breakers according to structural market
complexities described by chaos theory.  See Cunningham, From Random Walks, supra, at 602.
114  Frank Partnoy has proposed eliminating circuit breakers and replacing them with a Federal
Reserve as the stock buyer of last resort.  Partnoy, supra note xx, at 802-03.  His idea is if the market
declined by a certain percentage the Fed would begin offering to buy S&P 500 contracts at 20% below
the opening market price.  He believes this would pose no moral hazard problem and the main behavior
it would encourage is the diversification of portfolios and, on the brink of a panic, restore confidence, with
investors safe in the knowledge that they stand to lose at most 20%.  What if this does not calm people and
selling pressure continues?  Or it calms them today but they all come back again next, losing another 20%?
It would only take a few episodes to wipe a lot of people out.  And then the Federal government is a major
shareholder of corporate America.  Partnoy notes that in the event of a crash without this policy the Fed
would nevertheless provide liquidity by purchasing government bonds on the open market.  He argues that
his proposal just enables the Fed to do directly what it would now do indirectly.  
There is a big difference, however, between buying stock directly and repurchasing debt securities
the Fed itself had functionally issued.  US taxpayers would be funding this insurance program, Partnoy
argues in its favor.  But why should all taxpayers pay for the bail out of investors?  Investors should know
they are getting into a risky business; part of that risk is they join a giddy parade of excess; part of that
experience should be to learn the lessons from such risk taking.  Those opting not to participate in that game
of risk should not be forced to shoulder the burden–or at least not pursuant to this automatic device.
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The apparent concern of the circuit breakers is an absence of liquidity.  They are, however,
designed to bring buyers back to restore it.  A major behavioral problem with circuit breakers is they can
heighten fears and operate as a magnet to pull the market to the trigger level.  They also draw in arbs and
speculators who bet on whether the trigger will be hit, which can also become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Moreover, many forces other than relative liquidity affect trading volume and patterns, and therefore any
market or regulatory mechanism addressing market crashes must be evaluated in the larger context of such
other forces.113
These complexities are not well understood, the influence of psychological factors indeterminate,
and the effects of the regulation themselves highly uncertain.  Indeed, the architects of the trading halts did
not see fit to draft rules that limit prices on their way up amid the speculative phase of the cycle, and rightly
so.  But if there is an insufficient economic policy basis to call for governmental control of the pricing during
the speculative phase of the cycle, there remains an insufficient economic basis for doing so on the way
down. Trading halts do not, in short, seem defensible as ways to deal with market inefficiencies.   Better,
again, to work with the indirect tools of proselytization and education rather than with the direct tools of
price control and regulation.114 
Prices should fall.  If they have been driven to heights above values then a correction should follow.
Any interfering with the fall is artificial.  It replaces irrational fantasy for the heuristics and other cognitive
limits that created the bubble.   It is a form of price controls that are disproved repeatedly every time they
are used.  Prices are driven, constantly, to equilibrium, the point where supply meets demand, where
115  This can occur both when the information is material and unlawfully withheld or when it is not.
 E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading
Regulation,  99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319, 1335 (1999).
116  E.g., Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End: The
Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 675 (1999); Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability
of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure,  71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 303 (1998); Jesse M.
Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421
(2000).
117 Obviously when the context for discussion is the EMH and its limits these finance decisions
relate only to corporations whose shares trade in public capital markets and does not generally address
closely held and other non-public business organizations except to the extent that doctrines in one field
inform those in the other and except to the extent that the issues discussed concerning raising funds bear
on the transitional firm in the process of preparing for and consummating an initial public offering (IPO).
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marginal cost equals marginal benefit. It is bad enough when that equilibrium is forestalled by cognitive
error.  When the consequence of the error is a price level bubbling higher than the value base, it is
compounding the error to stand in the way of its correction.  And that goes not only for the abrupt arrest
of the correction but also, though more weakly, for the gradual deflation of the bubble over time.  Either
way, artificial rather than merely natural forces are installed.  Hard as it may be to correct or forfend the
natural errors of cognitive bias, it is simply Frankensteinian tinkering to try to correct or forfend those
natural errors with artificial devices.
C.  Corporate Finance
Apart from better equipping investors to deal with behavioral realities through investor education,
a substantial range of legal implications of market inefficiency remain.  Lawyers and policy makers need
not only to be aware of these, but also must recognize the extent to which the existing legal framework fails
to deal with the issues they pose.  These laws in the area of corporate finance relate to situations that fall
into the three categories of raising, deploying, and distributing funds.
Most legal scholarship in these three area considers cases where a transaction is made at a price
different from value due to an issuer failing to disclose information that explains the difference.115   This
scholarship seeks solutions that limit the ability of insiders to exploit such circumstances for personal
profit.116    Left out of this literature are transactions effected at prices that differ from value simply because
the market is not digesting disclosed information properly and without any motive of the insiders other than
for the corporation to take advantage of an inefficient market for cheap financing.  The following discussion
centers on that situation in the three financing contexts.117
118  Shleifer, supra, at, 187 (citing A. Brav. C. Geczy and Paul Gompers, Is the Abnormal Return
Following Equity Issuances Anomalous, mimeo, Duke University (1999)); Tim Loughran and Jay R. Ritter,
The Operating Performance of Firms Conducting Seasoned Equity Offerings, 52 J. Fin. 1823 (1997).
119  Securities Act of 1933, § 11; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10b(5).
120  This conundrum of clashing duties is not unique to corporate financing through public equity
offerings.  As others have noted, directors engaged in merger negotiations sometimes face a disclosure duty
under Federal securities that would be inconsistent with fiduciary duties they owe their stockholders under
state law.  E.g., Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak  to the Market,  77 Va.
L. Rev. 945 (1991); Marcel Kahan, Games, Lies and Securities Fraud,  67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 750 (1992);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-
the-Market Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1059 (1990).  What is important is that whether the duties in this
context are indeed in tension varies depending on whether the markets are efficient.  
121  A credible argument could be made that the failure to exploit such pricing inefficiency is a
dereliction of duty if not an actual breach  See generally Edward Adams & David Runkle, The Easy Case
for Derivatives: Advocating a Corporate Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 595
(2000).
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1.  Raising Funds
If a stock market is not efficient, then a company’s stock may be over- or under-priced compared
to its intrinsic value.  For a company with an existing class of public stock outstanding, a good time to issue
new shares to raise funds is when the market is over-pricing that stock compared to value.  If the stock is
trading at $5 but is only worth $4, a company can “make” $1 per share by selling new shares.  Secondary
securities offerings are often timed in precisely this way.118  A nice legal question arises: are directors who
make such a decision to offer discharging their legal duties?  (Note that this legal question does not arise
in efficient markets, where the offering price is the correct value.)
Directors are discharging their state law fiduciary duties in such an over-priced offering to the extent
that both the corporation is making money on the deal and this benefits at least the existing shareholder
group.  But for buyers in the offering, this is a bad bargain.  While the directors at the time of the offering
don’t owe that group any fiduciary duty, they do owe them disclosure duties under Federal securities laws.
Those laws require disclosure of all material facts.  If it is known that the company is exploiting a market
inefficiency and this is not disclosed, then this would constitute a violation.119 
Directors thus face a conflict between duties owed to existing holders and duties owed to the
buyers.120   One way out of this conflict would be to observe that directors have no duty to effect the
offering at all.  Under the business judgment rule, a board would not be legally required by fiduciary duties
to effect an offering.121    But there will be times when boards in such a circumstance nevertheless find it
necessary or desirable to effect an offering.  Once a decision to effect an offering were made, the price
122   This also means, of course, that wholly apart from business reasons to avoid effecting offerings
at prices lower than values, legal rules deter it too.  In any event, though, waste is a difficult claim for a
shareholder to sustain doctrinally, usually requiring meeting a burden not much different from the business
judgment rule.  E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law (2000) 346.  But even while a judicial
presumption might exist in favor of upholding a transaction, the doctrine encompasses and justifies
rescinding transactions in which the corporation did not receive “the equivalent to what it gave in the deal.”
Id.
123  Revlon v. McAndrews & Forbes Holding Co., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 345 (1994). 
124  It is a crime for any person to “willfully” violate any provision of the Federal securities law
statutes or the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder and is also a crime for any person to “willfully”
(and in the case of the Exchange Act, “knowingly”) make a false statement in a filing submitted to the SEC.
See Cox, Hillman, & Langevoort, Securities Regulation, at 952.
125 The evidence includes something even worse: that firms planning equity offerings, both
secondary and initial, often massage their earnings to indicate growth trends that are mere figments of
accounting imagination in violation of securities laws.  S. W. Teoh, et al., Earnings Management and the
Long Run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 53 J. Fin. 1935 (1998);   S. W. Teoh, et al.,
Earnings Management and the Long Run Market Performance of Seasoned Equity Offerings, 50 J. Fin.
Econ. 63 (1998).  Evidence shows such earnings smoothing in connection with stock options as well.  E.g.,
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would to some degree be subject to judicial scrutiny under state fiduciary law.  On the low end, the price
could not be set so low as to constitute waste of the corporation’s assets.122  At the higher end, there is at
least a credible theoretical argument that the board is required to get the highest price it can–including a
price above value if the market is offering to pay it.
That theoretical argument recognizes that a decision to effect a secondary offering of securities is
a decision to sell part of the company to the buyers.  Decisions to sell the entire company require a board
as a matter of fiduciary duty to get the highest value for shareholders reasonably available and subject a
board to enhanced judicial scrutiny of their decisionmaking process.123  The predicate of this enhanced
scrutiny of director action in selling a company is some degree of self interest facing a director (his job is
in some sense at stake when the company is on the block).  But an analogous and maybe even more acute
conflict faces directors in this situation: failure to disclose poses the risk of violating the Federal securities
laws and, in extreme cases, being sent to jail.124   As a result, the conflict between Federal and state law
is particularly sharp, with the Federal consequences reinforcing their conflict with the state law.
Empirical evidence about how the conflict plays out in practice suggests that managers make these
kinds of high-priced offerings all the time, exploiting the market inefficiency and in effect privileging state
law fiduciary duties to get the best deal they can for their holders over disclosure duties suggesting they
should disclose their views of market pricing.125  That compliance with both duties is the rare case is
Robert W. Holthausen, et al., Annual Bonus Scheme and the Manipulation of Earnings, 19 J. Acct. &
Econ. 29 (1995).  
Evidence also shows that managers actively manage disclosure timing to maximize the value of their
options, as by issuing negative news ahead of option grants and hence exercise price setting and positive
news ahead of option exercise and hence values.  E.g., David Aboody & Ron Kasznick, CEO Stock
Option Awards and Corporate Voluntary Disclosures (unpublished manuscript available on SSRN,
Nov.1998).  Notably, these disclosure management techniques are not likely to constitute violations of
either the letter or the spirit of Federal securities or state fiduciary law.  See Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer
Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures To Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned
Incentives?, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 83 (2000).  Instead, this practice constitutes a new variation on the
old problem of agency costs, so that amelioration lies in ordinary tools of corporate governance such as
board oversight and, especially, structuring option packages to avoid the enhanced risks posed by options
paid at a single time (the “one big payday”).  Id.
126  Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Prospectus: Class B Common Stock (1996) (emphasis added).  It
continued as follows:
2. Berkshire's historical rate of growth in per-share book value is NOT indicative of possible future
growth. Because of the large size of Berkshire's capital base (approximately $17 billion at
December 31, 1995), Berkshire's book value per share cannot increase in the future at a rate even
close to its past rate.  
3. In recent years the market price of Berkshire shares has increased at a rate exceeding the
growth in per-share intrinsic value. Market overperformance of that kind cannot persist indefinitely.
Inevitably, there will also occur periods of underperformance, perhaps substantial in degree.  
4. Berkshire has attempted to assess the current demand for Class B shares and has tailored the
size of this offering to fully satisfy that demand. Therefore, buyers hoping to capture quick profits
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suggested by the excitement and applause given to the managers of Berkshire Hathaway when they effected
an offering of a new class of stock in a recapitalization of the company by saying, in effect, they were taking
advantage of market mis-pricing.   A conspicuous legend on page one of the prospectus for the offering
included the following:
 
Warren Buffett, as Berkshire's Chairman, and Charles Munger, as Berkshire's Vice Chairman,
want you to know the following (and urge you to ignore anyone telling you that these statements
are "boilerplate" or unimportant):  
1. Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger believe that Berkshire's Class A Common Stock is not
undervalued at the market price stated above. Neither Mr. Buffett nor Mr. Munger would
currently buy Berkshire shares at that price, nor would they recommend that their families
or friends do so.126 
are almost certain to be disappointed. Shares should be purchased only by investors who expect
to remain holders for many years
127  See Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections on the Pricing of Shares, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 493, 500-
502 (1997).  This paper was delivered at a live conference of several hundred experts, including Buffett
and Munger.  The latter commented after this paper as follows:
It is an interesting story. You can argue that it demonstrates an important principle of law: you don't
want the judges running the prisons or the detailed operations of the corporations of America or
whatnot, and yet you want certain standards of behavior that are so awful that you want judges or
legislatures to intervene. Between that intervention point and the best possible behavior should be
a big area, and you want a big area where it isn't illegal in the sense that courts will intervene, but
where you allow room for a lot of behavior that's a lot better than the minimum standards. And I
would argue that this prospectus was just an example of behavior that was better than the minimum
standards of the civilization, and to the extent that anybody wants to make it an example for law
students or anybody else, I encourage it.  
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Conversations from the Warren Buffett Symposium, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 719,
784-85 (1997).
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Berkshires’s managers seemed to be discharging both duties–to get the highest price reasonably
available for this partial sale of the company and to disclose to the buyers that this price was likely to be
greater than the value they are getting.  Experts and practitioners of corporate law and finance alike
marveled at the candor in this step, suggesting at least anecdotally that the practice is not widely followed
in corporate America and that, if markets really are inefficient, then there are real tensions being ignored
between state corporate and Federal securities law.127 
If the conflict is real and the doctrine and practice suggest a privileging of state fiduciary duties over
federal disclosure duties, the question is whether that is the correct hierarchy or should it be inverted (or,
more extremely, should both duties simply be abolished).  The source of the problem, as well as its cost,
are price-value deviations.  Accordingly, the rule of resolution should be the choice that most tends to close
rather than to widen or ignore the gap.  
Abolishing both duties risks sustaining the deviations, enabling management to take unbridled
advantage of continuing deviations.  Retaining or privileging the fiduciary rule would tend to produce buying
pressure on the stock and thus to widen or sustain the gap, with price above value.  Retaining or privileging
the disclosure rule would tend to produce selling pressure and thus to widen or sustain the gap, with price
below value.  Retaining both should benefit from the tension in these cross-pressures and therefore tend
to produce a price closer to value.
There can be no assurances, on the other hand, that disclosure or non-disclosure will induce such
pressure, because of cognitive biases or otherwise.  Indeed, compliance with both rules is also possible and
128  See Jonathan A. Shayne & Larry D. Soderquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public
Offerings, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 965 (1995) (in the case of IPOs, securities law prescriptions to discourage
or eliminate practices including stabilization, issuance of unduly positive research reports on recent IPOs,
the syndicate penalty bid, and refusal to lend shares for short sales.).
129   So can related decisions concerning stock splits.
130  Note that determining the return of paying $4 to repurchase stock worth $5 is not as simple as
determining the return of paying $4 to expand a warehouse that will generate a return valued at $5.  The
latter would generate a return of 25% ($5 of value is created through the outlay of $4, so $4 of outlay
landed $1 of additional value and 1/4 = 25%).  In the case of repurchasing one’s own equity securities,
however, no real investment is being made and the funds used to effect the repurchase are no longer in the
corporation or working for the corporation.  What will happen is the number of shares outstanding will fall
and thus the remaining shares outstanding rise in value.  Due to inefficient markets we cannot say that they
will rise in price by a proportional amount, though share repurchases do seem to be taken by the market
as signals that a share is underpriced and the result is usually a rise in price (though perhaps not
proportionally and hence all that can be said is the price-value gap should narrow rather than disappear).
Evidence shows that corporations do take advantage of these inefficiencies in precisely this manner and
these effects. David Ikenberry et al., Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases, 39 J.
Fin. Econ. 181 (1995).  It is unlawful for a corporation to raise the price of its shares through buy backs
for the purpose of inducing new purchases. Exchange Act, §§ 9(a)(2), 10b(5). (None of this would be
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at least in the case of the Berkshire Hathaway offering just mentioned investors fully subscribed the caution-
accompanied issuance in any event.  Thus management discharged both these duties, it generated all it
sought from the financing, and there was no reason to believe that it had any immediate effect on the proper
pricing of the shares.  Even so, the evaluation of which of these two duties should be privileged when the
two conflict–as well as evaluation of all other legal rules that bear on the regulation of such offerings–should
be undertaken by considering the effects of those rules on the price-value relationship.128  
2.  Distributing Funds
A corporation can distribute funds to equity holders either through the declaration and payment of
dividends or by share repurchases.  Both these decisions can be strongly influenced by the presence of
market inefficiencies.129  
In the case of share buy backs, things are just the other way around when compared with stock
offerings.  That is, repurchases are desirable from the corporation’s standpoint when the company’s shares
are priced in the market at levels below their values.  
If a company’s stock is trading at $4 but it is really worth $5, the company can at least close the
gap between price and value and thus generate some improvement in real returns to investors by funds
spent buying back stock.130  But not all shareholders will be treated equally by such a move. First, the gain
possible in efficient markets.    In efficient markets, a corporate buy back may appear to increase demand
and hence the price of its shares but it also reduces the corporation’s assets and earnings per share,
creating downward price pressure that should offset the upward pressure exactly.)
131  In a corporate buy back from shareholders, a director’s duties under state corporate law and
Federal securities law are not in conflict in the way they are in an offering to new shareholders, for a
disclosure that says we are repurchasing shares we believe are undervalued is consistent with a corporate
interest of allocating capital in ways that generate value to the corporation (i.e., purchasing things at prices
lower than values), though this does not mean a disappointed shareholder will not sue claiming breach of
both these duties.   See Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973); Staffin v.
Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F.
Supp. 721 (E.D. Va. 1980).
132   E.g., MBCA 8.30(a).
133  E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkum, et al.
134  E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporations 304-305 (2000).
135  In the context of freeze-out merger pricing, some have distinguished between shareholders who
purchased at prices that theoretically reflected a discount for the risk of being frozen out (e.g., at a time
when a majority block existed) from those who purchased at price that did not reflect that discount (e.g.,
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in value from closing the price-value gap will accrue only to shareholders who continue to be shareholders
after the repurchase.   Those who sell in connection with the repurchase are selling at the price below value
and not enjoying any of the benefit of the higher price that more closely reflects the higher value.  Second,
clear losers will be any shareholders who purchased that same stock within a short time earlier at a price
above $4.
Directors effecting a share repurchase in these price-below-value circumstances thus may discharge
a duty to the corporation but in the process impair the interests of a shareholder or entire groups of
shareholders.131  (Again, in efficient markets, this problem simply does not arise because price and value
are the same and all are paying or receiving the same.)
This perspective exposes a major and usually hidden ambiguity in corporate law. Fiduciary duties
are routinely said by courts and commentators to be owed by directors and officers to the “corporation.”132
That description is usually altered when the context requires it to the “corporation and its shareholders,”
as when directors are negotiating a sale of the corporation.133  While the splicing goes on to consider what
comprises “the corporation”–employees, creditors, suppliers, communities and so on–no further distinction
between the corporation on the one hand and the shareholders on the other is typically pursued.134  
There are cases where corporate law must choose between shareholder groups, such as between
preferred and common holders or between majority and minority common holders.135  But there are few
at a time when no majority block existed).   Gevurtz, supra, at 737. 
Shareholders whose cashing out contributed value in the form of tax benefits to the corporation are
entitled to no greater share of the value than are shareholders of the same class whose cashing out did not
make such a contribution.  In the Matter of Cawley v. SCM Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 465 (1988).
136  E.g., Unocal, et al.
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doctrinal areas where corporate law has managed to identify much less resolve the problem of
shareholders–or, more precisely, one group of shareholders–versus the corporation.  One answer would
be to return to the standard statements and conclude that the corporation’s overall interests are privileged
compared to the interests of any particular group, and there is some support for this in the special context
of the selective defensive self-tender offer.136  If so, then directors could choose to effect a buyback at a
price lower than value without regard to whether some shareholders are hurt in the process.  
But should this be corporate law’s response?  A more precise response would be to call on
mangers to consider the impact of corporate decisions on particular shareholder groups.  Most broadly,
in capital allocation decisions such an approach would call for directors to make decisions based on
shareholder-specific factors such as particular liquidity needs and tax brackets.  Such an approach would
be unwieldy to say the least, and is sufficient reason for the law’s unwillingness to impose such an arduous
burden.  
Yet there is a commonsensical appeal to affording the shareholders some protection of their
idiosyncratic positions.  In the context of repurchases this appeal could be satisfied by a device far simpler
and efficacious than requiring directors to consider their infinite particularity.  The device is to give each
shareholder the direct voice in choosing whether or not to accept the repurchase.  This is not far fetched.
At present there are two common and straightforward ways to effect share repurchases:  in the
open market or through formal tender offer.  The chief substantive difference is that the tender offer route
leaves it up to each shareholder whether to sell shares back to the company whereas in the open market
route this decision rests entirely with the company’s board.  A policy that promotes the use of the self-
tender rather than the open market would promote the objective of lodging the power to decide in existing
shareholders. 
Oddly, the law does not presently do this.  The chief regulatory difference between open market
purchases and self tenders is the latter must comply with Section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act (as
amended by the Williams Act) and Rule 13e-4 thereunder, including disclosure requirements.  The
regulatory scheme may have the intuitive appeal of imposing disclosure rules on offers where shareholders
actually make a decision.  Yet it is backwards as it imposes greater costs on adopting the approach that
is superior for shareholders and that eliminates the problems inefficient markets create for this way of
allocating corporate capital.
The current defense of this menu for managers is that there is also an implicit private  ordering
137  A special case concerns  “greenmail,” share repurchases that leave some stockholders out while
paying a price greater than either the prevailing market price or the actual value to a third party posing
threats to the corporation such as unwanted acquisition overtures. The special case is omitted from this
discussion, other than to say that cases reviewing director’s discharge of fiduciary of duty in paying
greenmail that focus on the difference between the payment amount and the price are myopic. E.g.,
Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985) (upholding injunction against
shareholder alleged to have aided and abetted corporate directors’ breach of fiduciary duty in greenmail
transaction in part on grounds that shareholder “knew it was reselling its stock at a price considerably
above market value”).  The important inquiry is the difference between the payment amount and value.
138  Modigliani and Miller make two major claims, one mentioned in the text and one other.  The
irrelevance thesis holds that the market value of a company is independent of capital structure.  That is,
when securities are correctly valued, based on cash flows, then the total market value of all a firm’s
securities will equal the present value of all its future profits.  This means that any attempts by a company
to use varying mixes of debt and equity to increase its market value would fail and are a waste of time.  If
the assumption of market efficiency is removed because markets are observed to be inefficient, then the
thesis crumbles.  The debt/equity mix becomes a potentially significant factor in market pricing because it
can be used to create different sorts of cash flow streams that different sorts of investors may have stronger
or weaker preferences for with resulting variations on market pricing.  The Modigliani-Miller irrelevance
thesis has been embraced routinely by legal academics but has not escaped criticism either.  E.g., William
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solution to the surface dilemma that makes the problem dissolve.    Managers sympathetic to the individual
and tailored needs of shareholders can signal their sympathy by disclosing and following clear principles
that guide their capital allocation decisions.  A no dividend policy, for example, could be justified for a
company with tremendous growth and investment opportunities available to it and could seek to attract
investors in high tax brackets with no liquidity needs.  
Even so, the practice and the results remain imperfect.  The menu is prone to change and must
adapt to meet new circumstances.  An approach that avoids those problems of the ex ante perspective
would simply be to lodge the particularized decisions impacting these holder-specific matters to the holders
themselves.  In the case of share repurchases, that simply means requiring that the directors adopt the form
of the self-tender, where each holders decides to sell or not, rather than permitting open market purchases
in a company’s own stock.137 
As for managers actually signaling to shareholders certain traits and creating, in effect, a mall for
them to shop in, there is no question that such managers exist and that many mangers actually follow this
sort of practice.  Why they do so wo8uld be a mystery, were the EMH true, but obvious policy when it
is not.  The point can be drawn by turning attention to the other way managers can distribute funds to
shareholders–dividends.
Dividend theory and policy have been a particular specialty of the EMH, mainly by virtue of some
features of the so-called irrelevance hypothesis propounded by Modigliani and Miller.138  It essentially says
W. Bratton, Corporate Finance, Dividends, Noncontractability and Corporate Law, 19 Cardozo L. Rev.
409 (1997); David G. Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 Cardozo L. Rev.  1635
(1997).  
139  See J. Linter, Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings,
and Taxes, 46 Am. Econ. Rev. 97 (1956).
140  Plenty of companies whose earnings turn negative continue to pay out dividends according to
historic rates.  E.g., Mattell after the fiasco of buying the Learning Channel led to substantial and sustained
losses, the quarterly dividend checks kept being cut.
141  Beyond formal, manipulable and archaic legal capital rules, there are pretty much no legal
restrictions on dividends or dividend policy.  Hardly any judicial opinions ever have upheld a shareholder
challenge to a corporate dividend policy, either in general or in particular circumstances, even where there
was undoubted and objective grounds to show that the board’s policy was simply stupid and economically
irrational from the perspectives of both the company and the shareholders.  E.g., Kamin v. American
Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 App. Div. 1976); see also Elliott J.
Weiss, Teaching Accounting and Valuation in the Basic Course, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 679, 691 (1997)
(calling board’s decision “demonstrably foolish”).
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that a firm’s dividend policy (as to the timing or amount of payments) does not matter for the pricing or
valuation of the company.  The thesis depends on the accuracy of the assumption of efficient markets in the
sense of prices constituting accurate valuations.
But under behavioral finance where this is not true, dividend policy starts to matter very much for
pricing.  That is, preferences for a particular design of cash flows may attract different sorts of investors to
different securities that are otherwise identical in terms of intrinsic value (the present value of future cash
flows).  This means that dividends become a discretionary managerial tool that can be deployed to market
the company’s securities.139 
Stock differentiation by dividend design is also evidently widely practiced, as companies routinely
maintain dividend payouts that are steady and tend to rise or if they are cut they are cut only gradually (even
though underlying business conditions are far from steady, don’t always grow, and often fall).140  So it turns
out that dividends do matter and can be used for a wide range of purposes.  
This behavioral story of dividend policy does not necessarily mean that corporate law should begin
to regulate them in any particular way.141  The theory of the second best still applies and there remain good
reasons for judicial deference to directors concerning dividend policy, such as not having courts make
decisions for businesses about whether to expand and to what extent.  The behavioral story can even
defend bolstering judicial deference, for when different shareholders place differing utilities on various
income streams or their timing, it will be impossible for a board to please all shareholders, and just as
impossible for a judge to do so.
142  170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
143  422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. 1981).
144  The logic of limiting share buybacks to self-tenders does not follow in considering dividend
decisions for the latter are simply distributions with no offsetting reduction in outstanding shares.  A
functionally equivalent limitation on the discretion ordinarily given to director decisions would consider the
extent to which consideration has been given to disparate interests and effects of board decisions on
discrete shareholder groups. 
145  This example is drawn from an interchange that took place at a symposium featuring Warren
Buffett’s letters to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders.  See Cunningham, Conversations, supra, at 749-753.
146  By statute, stock swap statutory mergers always require board approval by each constituent
corporation as well as shareholder approval of each, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 251(c), except in the case
of small-scale mergers, upstream or downstream mergers, and holding company mergers.  See Dale A.
Oesterle, The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions, 23-27 (1999).  In some states (not including Delaware),
the swap can be effected by a share exchange agreement under which the acquiring company’s
shareholders do not get to vote, but only so long as it is not issuing substantially dilutive new stock, e.g.,
MBCA §§ 11,04, 6.21(f), which is the minority of cases.
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But to the extent judicial deference has rested on the implied view that market discipline was
adequate to police directorial machinations in dividend policy, behavioral finance undermines it.  It raises
the possibility that corporate law’s highly laissez faire view of director dividend decisions should be
revisited.  Doctrinally, this could mean as a simple a thing as there being more ways that a particular
dividend policy amount to bad faith under the standards set forth in cases such as Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co.142 and Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc.143  Though these close-corporation cases remain non-
generalizable to the public corporation case with respect to the differing preferences of discrete
shareholders, their rules about mixed motives or bad faith could be generalized and broadened to police
director failure to consider these trade offs.144
  
3.  Deploying Funds
Funds not distributed to investors are available for deployment in investment.  It is useful to
distinguish between the general form of investment and investment effected by the acquisition of other
existing businesses.  In the case of such acquisitions, those chiefly affected by market inefficiencies involve
acquisitions paid for in stock.
Take an example, supposing at the outset an efficient market.145  Company A is selling at $100 a
share and Company B at $80 a share, but putting them together as Company AB creates enough synergy
to yield a trading price of $102.  Contrast two merger dynamics.146
First: assume Company A offers an even one-for-one share-for-share exchange of A for B.  B’s
147  This would constitute a “sale” of the corporation calling for enhanced judicial scrutiny of the
board’s actions under the leading takeover cases noted above in discussing share offerings.  Revlon v.
McAndrews & Forbes Holding Co., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 345 (1994). 
148  This would not constitute a “sale” of the corporation triggering such scrutiny.
149  These examples show difficulties that extend well beyond now-standard non-EMH critiques
of particular legal practices.  These critiques theorize that price formation is driven by the marginal buyer
of shares (i.e., those with the least optimistic expectations of the future).  Other shareholders may value the
shares at levels substantially higher than the prevailing price.  This view of pricing leads to a series of
critiques of typical legal responses to takeovers, such as that a bid exceeding market price constitutes a
premium to the target’s shareholders when all it really amounts to is a premium for the target’s marginal
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holders and its board are likely to respond favorably, on the grounds they are getting a share priced at $100
for a share priced at $80.  A court under current law would scrutinize the B board’s conduct and decision
in this case but would almost certainly find it met its fiduciary duties.147  No such enhanced scrutiny would
apply under current law to A’s board, even though it is paying such a premium or, more precisely, selling
part of itself to combine B with A, at a $2 per share profit.148  
Second: assume Company B offers the same one-for-one share-for-share exchange of B for A.
A’s holders and board are more likely to respond unfavorably, on the grounds they are giving up a share
priced at $100 for a share priced at $80.  A’s board is now subject to enhanced judicial scrutiny of its
actions, and may be found to have violated its duties if it accepts such a lower price.  B’s board this time
has no such judicial scrutiny to fear.
The economics of the transactions are identical in terms of what the shareholders had versus what
they end up with. Either way: A holders had A stock at $100 and they end up with AB stock at $102; B
holders had B stock at $80 and end up with AB stock at $102.   The forms of the transactions are quite
different in terms of who is buyer and who seller and who is paying a premium or getting a discount.  Why
do the forms end up more important than the economics, as both a business matter in terms of the A
board’s response and as a legal matter in terms of which board is subject to enhanced judicial scrutiny?
If markets were purely efficient and the numbers in this hypothetical reflected actual values then the
form should be subordinated to the economics.  The boards should respond the same way and courts
should apply the same level of review to each board’s actions in both cases.  Yet this is not so.  Boards
do respond differently and judges review them differently.
So suppose that markets are not efficient.  If those numbers are not values but prices, then the
different behavior and review starts to make sense.  For example, it is possible that A’s board believes its
stock is overpriced at $100 and that it is really worth only $80.  If so, the transactions end up being quite
different.  In case 1, A is not really paying a premium at all to get its shareholders stock worth $102; in case
2, it is not receiving any premium for its contribution to the increase in value of AB.149  
shareholders.  See generally Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market
Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 Va. L. Rev. 611 (1995).
150  This description is itself revealing–shareholders receive payment upon a takeover whereas
corporations make the payment.
Buying other companies with stock when your stock is overpriced seems potentially value
enhancing.  One risk is that even if you use scrip trading at 5 that is worth 4, you may still be tempted to
use it to buy something that is worth 3.  Indeed, the problem of buyer overpayment, sometimes called the
winner’s curse, is exacerbated by overpriced stock with which to pay.  The seller faces the opposite picture
in a symmetrical way. 
151  The example given above concerning the choice between two alternatives with identical financial
outcomes but presented as requiring traversing two quite different paths is an example of the same
phenomenon.  Supra note xx. 
152  The apt but blasphemous quip is the apocryphal academic lament that “It may work in practice,
but it will never work in theory.”  Which in turn brings to mind a (useful) theory of theories, which is that
good theories have some practical applications.  
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This story even suggests that  the reasons for market inefficiency include those identified by
behavioral finance.  A’s board may have different assessments of the price-value relationship of its stock
depending on whether it is acting as the proposer or proposee in the exchange.  And boards and judges
evince greater concern about shareholders receiving too little than about their corporations paying too
much.150   These responses echo the endowment effect–shares being given up are seen as carrying greater
value relative to shares being used as currency to acquire something else.  More broadly, the contrast in
these cases admit behavioral explanations of frame dependence combined with loss aversion.151  
Whether one is the buyer or the seller does matter.  Form matters.  Markets do not produce divine
answers to business and social problems.  A role for courts remains.  Courts should examine these
situations differently because different perceptions and risks are at stake.   Even if in theory the economics
of the transactions are identical, in practice they are not.152
The judicial response could ignore the cognitive differences and examine only the economics.  The
standard of director behavior would be identical in both cases.  Or it could recognize, along with the
directors, that characterizing or positioning one party as buyer and one as seller does make a difference,
even if not as a matter of economics.  
But under this approach judges would approach the review differently.  Prevailing law suggests
judges evaluate the economics of the transaction.  This view suggests that economics alone is not the point,
but perception and cognitive bias are also.  A real conundrum opens up.  Judges embrace the business
judgment rule and other deferential standards based on what reasonable people do or would have done.
In this setting, there is an admission that reason is muted, suffused with heuristics.  The rhetoric of
153  If courts pierced the form to get at the substance they would be overcoming framing and loss
aversion biases.  If directors and judges have acted according to those biases in the past, it is reasonable
to suppose shareholders would too.  If that is correct, then perhaps judges should simply reflect the biases
that shareholders and directors share and permit director conduct that comports with that stand (even if
it is a product of cognitive biases that do not comport with rational choice theory).  On the other hand, if
we recognize that these biases produce error judgements in terms of maximizing end states, judges when
capable of doing so should penetrate them and prescribe results that comport with rational choice theory
rather than behavior decision theory.
154  See Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, supra.
155  For example, a firm that constantly seeks to exploit market inefficiency by issuing overpriced
securities may have to use some proceeds to invest in sub-optimal projects and this can create bubbles in
real investment markets, as happened in various Florida land rushes and railroad development enterprises.
See Shleifer, Inefficient Markets, supra, at 188-89. 
56
reasonableness is discordant with the reality of the deference.  It is deference to the cognitively biased, not
to the reasonable prudent man.  Or are these, after all, the same people?153
_________
The deployment of funds other than through corporate acquisition is less clearly affected by stock
market inefficiencies.  That is, the exploitation of timing and mispricing on the financing side doesn’t imply
anything about use of proceeds on the non-acquisition investment side.  For example, a company could
exploit an overpricing situation by effecting a secondary offering but then simply hoard the cash or it could
exploit underpricing by effecting a share buyback but simultaneously cut its dividend level to keep net
investable funds the same.
Important legal and policy questions nevertheless arise.  First, should firms be required or
encouraged to exploit market inefficiencies in these ways?  But if so, what about any conflicting duties, such
as disclosure obligations, they may impinge upon in doing these things?  Second, even if firms should be
allowed (let alone encouraged or required) to do these things, what effect should their doing so have on
the real investment side of the equation?  That is, should these financing tactics be exploited only so long
as they have no effect on the substantive capital allocation decisions or should it be recognized that there
will necessarily be such an effect.154 Questions such as these extend far beyond the particularized
relationship between directors/managers and shareholders.  Solutions are only now being sought by
economists who have been discarding EMH assumptions and trying to grapple with inefficiencies that drive
corporate financing and possibly investment decisions.  Much remains unclear in these pursuits.  
One thing that is clear is that these decisions can have a bearing on the periodic booms and busts
financial markets experience and that these in turn impact the markets for real assets from real estate to
franchises.155   Outstanding research issues include the precise shape and magnitude of the bearing and the
desirability of the boom/bust cycle in both financial-asset and real-asset markets.  In financial markets, for
156  Bubbles can thus be socially desirable when they enable funding otherwise unfundable projects.
That can produce substantial wealth, as Keynes suggested was the case in the 1920s market boom and
as many say is the case in the 1990s-2000s market boom.  Id.
157  See supra text accompany notes xx-xx (end of Part I.C.2 on model of hazards interplay).
158  This judicial innovation renders the 1934 Act’s anti-fraud provisions more like those under the
1933 Act, Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of which are strict liability statutes that dispense with the reliance
requirement (as well as the scienter requirement).
159  485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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example, though busts that follow booms can have devastating effects on people, businesses, and
communities, the boom that preceded it often generates vastly greater wealth than is taken away even
amidst the devastation.156   Even so, distributive questions are unanswered and policy touchstones remain
elusive for these macro social questions.157  
At present, therefore, all law and legal policy can do is focus on the relationship between
management and shareholder (existing or prospective). Sticking to that legal knitting calls for keeping in
force fiduciary and disclosure duties regulating share issuances that seem in tension; heightening judicial
willingness to superintended director decisions concerning corporate distributions; and recognizing that
cognition and perception, in addition to pure economics, play an important role in director decisions
approving stock-for-stock mergers and acquisitions and judicial scrutiny thereof.
D.  Litigation
This piece finishes up by considering two of the most striking areas where the EMH was expressly
used in corporate and securities law, both relating to litigation.  The first concerns the fraud on the market
theory in stock-price drop securities fraud action lawsuits; the second concerns the stock market exception
to the appraisal remedy otherwise available in cash out mergers and other cases.
1.  Fraud on the Market
The fraud on the market theory is a legal doctrine that permits plaintiffs to maintain securities fraud
class actions without the need to prove the reliance element of individual claimants essential to ordinary
common law fraud claims.158  The reliance element is presumed to be satisfied for claims about securities
that trade in public capital markets on the theory that the alleged fraud was reflected in the price at which
plaintiffs traded securities.  In other words, fraud on the market theory assumes that certain types of
markets are efficient in the sense described by the EMH.
The fraud on the market theory emerged in the Federal district and circuit courts in the late 1970s
and early 1980s and was endorsed by a divided Supreme Court in Basic v. Levinson.159   Thereafter,
160  Called the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the PSLRA), the restrictions
include staying discovery while any motion to dismiss is pending, raising the  specificity in pleading fraud
to allege a “strong inference” of fraud, and limiting damages to the difference between the plaintiff’s trading
price and the securities’ mean trading price during the 90-days after the fraudulent statements were cured.
See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4 ff.
161  See, e.g., Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., 2000 N.J. LEXIS 993 (NJ 2000).
162  Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified in scattered sections of 15 USC §§ 77-80).
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hundreds of Federal cases regularly applied the doctrine as a matter of routine.  The flow of securities fraud
cases to Federal courts was interrupted for a few years, however, after the US Congress passed legislation
in 1995 seeking to limit or eliminate class action strike suits in stock price drop cases where the fraud on
the market theory had been used. This legislation put numerous restrictions on these suits, though it did not
address the fraud on the market theory at all.160 
The new Congressional barriers seemed to have outweighed the benefits of the fraud on the market
theory, however, for increasing numbers of these cases were afterwards brought in state courts but no state
high court had embraced the fraud on the market theory.161   That unintended effect was stemmed with the
passage, in 1998, of additional Federal legislation requiring that any securities fraud action brought on
behalf of a class of more than 50 individual investors had to be brought in Federal rather than state court.162
Back the cases went to Federal court, and roaring back to vibrancy with them was the fraud on the market
theory, on which this legislation again was silent.
In efficient markets, the fraud on the market theory is an obvious triumph of logic, law and policy.
The price reflects everything, including fraudulent statements.  Investors look to the price in making
decisions and use it when they actually trade.  So they rely on the statements when they trade, paying a
fraudulently-inflated price when they buy and receiving a fraudulently-deflated price when they sell.  But
with inefficient markets, the theory crumbles.  Investors may look at, even rely on, the price, but the price
has no necessary connection to the statements at all.   To continue to embrace the fraud on the market
theory in the face of evidence of market inefficiencies is then to indulge in a fiction.  
There is nothing inherently wrong with relying on a fiction but it is useful to be aware that is what
is being done.  Yet the tenacity with which Federal courts have held onto the fraud on the market theory
without admitting that it is fiction does not reflect so much a devotion to the EMH as such but rather a
recognition that the fraud on the market theory is a useful tool to solve administrative problems of securities
fraud class actions. The main appeal of the fraud on the market theory is that in the securities fraud class
action context, presuming reliance is virtually always necessary to enable a lawsuit to be certified as a class
action.  Without the presumption, factual issues open up that require intensive discovery and plaintiff-by-
plaintiff inquiries concerning individual reliance that would often be punishing if not prohibitively
163  An innovative economic argument favoring fraud on the market theory’s dispensing with the
reliance requirement holds that risks of misrpresentation in securities fraud are greater than in transactions
involving real goods and therefore securities fraud actions should create greater deterrence than the
common law deceit action and reducing the reliance requirement is a reasonable way to do so. See
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds, Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market: The Tortured Transition of
Justifiable Reliance from Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 U. Miami L. Rev. 671 (1995).
164  See Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., 2000 N.J. LEXIS 993 (NJ 2000).  
165  See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. at 244 (calling the market the defendant’s “unpaid agent”).
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expensive.163    
Even if the fraud on the market theory is a pragmatic solution to a real problem, however, when
the firmaments of a legal theory are unsound as in the case of the EMH underlying the fraud-on-the-market
theory, then it should either be recognized as a fictional tool rather than rearticulated as social science
gospel or another tool more accurately rooted in fact should be developed to solve the problem without
falsely championing bad social science.  After all, evidence shows that the EMH is false, that prices do not
always or even often reflect the material false statements or omissions registrants make.  It also shows that
investors do not always or even often respond to such information in rational ways but according to a whole
set of cognitive biases that make presumptions of reliance on the statements through reliance on price
farfetched.
Even the doctrinal bases of the theory are a bit farfetched.  For example, a chief legal basis of the
theory is its functional equivalence to the indirect reliance doctrine.  The indirect reliance doctrine permits
satisfaction of the reliance requirement in ordinary fraud cases by pointing to statements made not by the
defendant directly but by his agent or others acting at its direction with the intention that the plaintiff should
hear it and rely.164  If the market functions as such as an agent or other person, then the fraud on the market
theory is functionally equivalent to the indirect reliance doctrine.165  Strange or strained as this analogy may
at first seem, it carries some purchase if the markets are in fact efficient.  If they are not efficient, however,
then the unpaid fictitious agent of the defendant is acting outside the scope of its authority.  The indirect
reliance doctrine analogy breaks down.
The theory itself can be understood in ways that distance itself from the truth of the EMH, but these
strategies do not fully succeed either.  For example, one doctrinal strategy for defending the fraud on the
market theory without indulging too much faith in the EMH recognizes that the theory does not excuse
reliance but rather furnishes a rebuttable presumption of reliance.  This works to permit defendants to show
that plaintiffs did not rely on the statements, as by showing that the plaintiff would have traded the way he
did even if he knew the statement was false or that the statements did not affect the price.  It makes a place,
in effect, to recognize non-efficient markets and even the insights of behavioral finance. This stance thus
shifts the burden from the plaintiff to prove reliance to the defendant to prove its absence.  Trouble is, if the
rationale of excusing the former is the administrative difficulty of individual proof in a class action, the theory
166  Of course, some who learn behavioral finance and the theory of cognitive biases may not follow
such a path of fundamental analysis but instead seek to exploit such strategies as the recognition heuristic
as short-cut.  See supra note xxx.
167  Assuming that class certification of a claim is desirable, the practical limitation on this device
or any other is to avoid triggering administrative, discovery or other protracting steps concerning reliance
issues.  Thus neither putative class members nor defense counsel would be involved in this step.  Rather,
plaintiff lead counsel would simply generate the clearly eligible class list by comparing the broader potential
class with a computerized record of SEC certified investors.  That group would enjoy presumed reliance.
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does not eliminate this problem but merely puts it on the other party, making the doctrine suffer from the
very problem it seeks to escape. 
Beyond these doctrinal and theoretical problems, a better way to solve the administrative challenge
would be to create or identify easily proven indicia of reliance.  The SEC certification program mentioned
earlier could be put to work in this effort.  It would be reasonable to presume that those investors having
taken the SEC investor program and earned its certification have been trained to think properly about the
fundamentals of investing and of behavioral finance.  That is, this group would reasonably be expected to
listen to statements management makes and to act on it in ways that approach accordance with principles
of rational choice theory (admitting that plenty of cognitive biases would persist).166  This could be a
superior basis for judicial presumptions of reliance by members of a putative class than the EMH.
Presuming reliance by investors who possess an SEC investor education certificate would entail
a bit more administrative work by class action trial judges than at present, but not much more and certainly
less than in a full blown reliance inquiry individual-by-individual.167  It would formally suffer from under-
inclusion and over-inclusion.  Some without the certificate may have relied and some with it may not have.
The under-inclusion problem can be cured by permitting uncertified claimants to prove reliance by
traditional means.  The over-inclusion problem cannot be cured, but there would be far fewer claimants in
certified classes that did not rely than is the case under the fraud on the market theory as it stands.  A
substantial fiction may remain in this mechanism, but also far less than under the fraud on the market theory
and at least we could start off admitting this indulgence.
2.  The Stock Market Exception to the Appraisal Remedy
In certain corporate transactions, such as majority freeze-out mergers, a shareholder can dissent
and require the corporation to pay her the fair value of her shares as determined by a judge in an appraisal
proceeding.  Appraisal proceedings are time-consuming and expensive and depend on judicial ability to
appraise value reasonably competently.  When the shares at issue trade on a reasonably well developed
capital market, therefore, it may be tempting to turn to the market for a measure of valuation rather than
to a judge.  As a result of that view, many states have chosen to limit the availability of the appraisal remedy
168  E.g., New York Business Corporation Law § 910; Revised Model Business Corporation Act
§ 13.01 (1999).  The RMBCA version of the stock market exception to the appraisal remedy applies when
there is a liquid market for the target’s shares and where the consideration being paid is either cash or
shares that are also liquid.  Nor does the exception apply to transactions in which managers of the target
are part of the acquisition group. 
169  For one thing, the appraisal statutes typically do not simply call for valuing a company at fair
market value, but rather “in its entirety as a going concern and then determining the fair value of the minority
shares as a pro rata percentage of that value.”  M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513 (Del.
1999) (citing Nebel v. Southwest Bancorp, Inc., 1995 Del. Ch. 80 (1995), which held that a banking
firm’s valuation opinion rendered to set the price in a short-firm merger was not legally proper because it
had determined only the “fair market value” of the minority shares).
170  The difference between price and value can be explained in part on the grounds that the
marginal buyer is the one that sets the price in the market, see supra note xx, and in part on the grounds
that the majority and minority, as well as other holders, exhibit different degrees of bias in their valuations,
whether from overreaction, representativeness, overconfidence, or what have you.
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to situations in which there is no such reliable alternative market measure.168 
This legislative preference for the market over the courthouse is far from compelling. 169 Suppose
a majority shareholder seeks to cash out a minority whose shares trade on an open market.  Some minority
shareholders object that the price is too low.  They are told, if there is a liquid market for their shares, tough
luck.  Take the price offered or leave it.  But why has the majority structured this cash out deal rather than
simply buying the shares on the open market at the market price?
The majority could go on the open market and purchase shares and may have done so.  Some
members of the minority might be sellers and the majority could buy their shares.  This pushes the market
price up and that may even induce some more members of the minority to sell.  But there may be hold outs
among the minority unprepared to sell at the price to which the majority’s purchases drive the market.  Still
the majority may wish to cash them out, but they don’t want to go. 
At this point, the only reason the majority is going to structure a cash out merger is it values the
shares at a level higher than the market price and higher than the price at which it proposes the deal.  Any
minority shareholders who continue to refuse to sell at that price and hence seek to perfect appraisal rights
are saying they value the shares at a level still higher than the price the majority is offering.170   The minority
may well be holding out for more on the grounds that they honestly and reasonably value their shares at
more than the last willing minority seller did (even if this belief is a product of biases).  The majority may
also honestly and reasonably value them at more than that last seller too (hence the deal) but not as much
as the minority (even if this belief is a product of opposite biases). 
When this is the case, remitting a minority to the market price on squeeze-out day interferes with
171  Courts have the power and discretion to select one of the party’s valuation models as its general
framework or fashion its own.  M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513 (1999).
172 This was the ingenious insight revealed by Chancellor Allen in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
C.A. No. 7129, slip op., 1990 WL 161084, *7-8 (Del. Ch. 1990) n.17, who put it far better:  
“[In some appraisal proceedings, it is possible to develop] either a completely independent
judicially created [discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation] or a pastiche composed of bits of one
model and piece of the other.  For good reasons aside from technical competence, one might be
disinclined to do so.  Simply to accept one experts' view or the other would have a significant
institutional or precedential advantage.  The DCF model typically can generate a wide range of
estimates.  In the world of real transactions (capital budgeting decisions for example) the
hypothetical, future-oriented, nature of the model is not thought fatal to the DCF technique because
those employing it typically have an intense personal interest in having the best estimates and
assumptions used as inputs.  In the litigation context use of the model does not have that built-in
protection.  On the contrary, particularly if the court will ultimately reject both parties DCF analysis
and do its own, the incentive of the contending parties is to arrive at estimates of value that are at
the outer margins of plausibility—that essentially define a bargaining range.  If it is understood that
the court will or is likely to accept the whole of one witnesses [sic] testimony or the other,
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capital allocations the parties would readily agree to.  Instead of the majority buying in the open market at
prices that increase as it buys, it enables the majority to use a single prevailing market price below both its
and the minority’s private valuations.  It is of course possible that the minority could claim an inflated
valuation, leading the majority to pay substantially more than a fair private valuation.   But that is what
appraisal proceedings are supposed to uncover that the market cannot, and an important judicial function
remains even where subject shares trade in liquid markets.
As with the fraud on the market theory, the stock market exception to the appraisal remedy may
be seen as a device intended not so much as a celebration of the EMH but as a pragmatic tool to solve a
difficult problem in litigation. The typical appraisal proceeding involves a protracted dual between financial
valuation experts who oppose one another not only in result but also in the proper model to use in even
thinking about the case.  The stock market exception may reflect legislative pragmatism to relieve judges
from being at the center of the dual.  If so, however, also as with the fraud on the market theory, there is
a better way to go.  
The judiciary could simply develop a rule for appraisal proceedings under which it will refrain from
evaluating the internal details of each expert’s model and refuse to develop an integrated model from the
parts of the competing models that seem to make the most sense.  Instead, the judge would simply choose
one expert’s model and valuation over the other’s, period.171  This would have the effect of substantially
contracting the litigation, contracting the range of valuations that the experts propose, and probably yield
a valuation that more accurately reflects the subjective but honest valuations of both the majority and
minority.172   Not only that, this kind of judicial horse sense would solve the administrative problem for all
incentives will be modified.  While the incentives of the real world applications of the DCF model
will not be replicated, at least the parties will have incentives to make their estimate of value appear
most reasonable.  This would tend to narrow the range of estimates, which would unquestionably
be a benefit to the process.
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appraisal proceedings, not just those concerning shares that trade in liquid markets.
Conclusion
The efficient market hypothesis is a special case in finance.  It explains only tiny fractions of
observed phenomena.  Perhaps its major contribution is a formal definition of an ideal market world, to
which policy formulations may be directed and against which they can be measured.  Indeed, it seems
unlikely that the infirmities of market action ever will be so minuscule as to render the EMH more than a
special case, though it may explain more in the future than it does now.  However things evolve, during the
evolutionary course the shackles of the EMH should be unloosed from corporate and investing culture.
Apart from that substantive conclusion, a word of methodological conclusion is in order on the
particular place the foregoing analysis fits in the bourgeoning legal literature drawing on behavioral social
science.   The genealogy of behavioral finance traces itself to branches of psychology and economics.  Its
great-grandparents on the psychology side were the behaviorists such as B. F. Skinner and on the
economics side the financial economists such as Paul Samuelson.  Its grandparents were both
revolutionaries against those traditions: the cognitive revolution in psychology during the 1960s and the
discovery of extensive anomalies in efficient market theory in the 1980s, both of which are concerned with
human thought processes in a way their forebears were not.  Behavioral decision theory emerged from
cognitive psychology’s study of human thought processes that raised substantial doubts about rational
choice theory while noise theory emerged from financial economists who applied those insights to capital
market phenomena.  The result is behavioral finance, a marriage of cognitive psychology and the financial
economics of market inefficiency.
Throughout this intellectual history legal scholars with a  social sciene inclination have drawn on
various strands of thought pioneered in these fields.  At a general level, principles of psychology played a
substantial role in theory and practice concerning the institution of the jury and the tools of economics were
deployed in all aspects of law with such a distinctive style of analysis that the whole field was given its own
name and so sweeping in scope that the name was “law and economics.”  As with many other intellectual
endeavors borne in the social studies departments, legal scholars in a wide variety of fields are importing
the work of the cognitive psychologists, principally behavioral decision theory (which they call BDT).  
As with such large-scale importation that has taken place in the past, the leaders of this
development have sought to ease the fears of the critics and skeptics (and implicitly guide the direction of
its users).  The present concerns of the lead importers center on the usefulness of BDT to legal scholarship
and policymaking generally.  A key concern is whether all it will do is furnish criticism of law and economics
and fail to offer its own positive theories of law or normative prescriptions.  If that is all it did, these lament,
173  Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology, supra, at 741.
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“BDT risks devolving into a degenerate research agenda with no positive theories, as has been the fate of
critical legal studies.”173  Whatever power BDT has for legal scholarship in general and whatever its fate
may be in a battle with principles of law and economics, this Article should leave no doubt that it furnishes
a positive theory of market behavior quite different than that of efficiency (imported and promoted by some
law and economics devotees) and that this theory carries with it substantial normative implications for law
and legal policy in the fields of securities and corporate law. 
